Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2008

Bruce Hills and Judith Hills v. United Parcel
Service., Inc., UPSCO United Parcel Service Co.,
United Parcel Service Inc., Liberty Mutual Holding
Company Inc., Skyline Electric Company : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Edward P. Moriarty; Bradley L. Booke; Moriarty, Badaruddin and Booke; Daniel J. Davis; Jason
Schwartz; Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher.
Gary L. Johnson; Tawni J. Anderson; Zachary E. Peterson; Richards, Brandt, Miller and Nelson.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Hills v. United Parcel Service, No. 20080826.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2844

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS,
individually, and as natural parents and
heirs of MARK D. HILLS,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE., INC., an
Ohio Corporation; UPSCO UNITED
PARCEL SERVICE CO., a Delaware
Corporation, UNITED PARCEL
SERVICE INC., a Utah Corporation;
LIBERTY MUTUAL HOLDING
COMPANY, INC., a Massachusetts
Mutual Holding Company; and SKYLINE
ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,

Appeal No. 20080826

Defendants/Appellees
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

EDWARD P. MORIARTY
BRADLEY L. BOOKE
MORIARTY, BADARUDDIN & BOOKE,
LLC
8 East Broadway, Suite 312
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (406) 326-8090
Fax No.: (406) 521-0546
DANIEL J. DAVIS {admittedpro hac vice)
JASON SCHWARTZ {admittedpro hac vice)
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
1801 California Street, Suite 4200
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (202) 955-8500
Facsimile: (202) 467-0539

GARY L. JOHNSON [4353]
TAWNI J. ANDERSON[8133]
ZACHARY E. PETERSON [8502]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

Attorneys for Hanson Equipment, Inc.
Wells Fargo Center, 15th Floor
299 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
E-mail: gary-johnson(g),rbmn.com
tawni-anderson(q)rbmn.com
zachary-petersonfSjrbmn.coro
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801)531-2000
Fax No.: (801)532-5506

IN Till: UTAH SUPREME COURT
BRUCE HILLS AM) JUDITH HILLS,
individually, and as natural parents and
heirs of MARK •> '!" ' ^
Plaintiffs/ Appellants,
vs.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE., INC., an
' ' ' Corporation; UPSCO UNITED
PARCEL SERVICE CO., a Delaware
Corporation, UNITED PARCEL
SERVICE INC., a Utah Corporation;
LIBERTY MUTUAL HOLDING
( t >MPANY, INC., a Massachusetts
"\l .lual Holding Company; and SKYLINE
i .i.i-CTRIC COMPANY^ a Utah
Corporation.

Appeal No. JI»;<XONJ<>

Defendants/Appellees
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
EDWARD P. MORJARTY
BRADLEY L. BOOKE
MHR1ARTY, B A D A R m u i

•<• > >

LLC

8 East Broadway, Suite 312
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (406) 326-8090
• • \' ( . : (406) 521-0546
DANIEL J. DAVIS {admittedpro hac vice)
I \ SON SCHWARTZ {admittedpro hac vice)
CiMiSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
1801 California Street, Suite 4200
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (202) 955-8500
Facsimile: (202) 467-0539

GARY L. JOHNSON [4353]
TAWNI J. ANDERSON[8133]
ZACHARY E. PETERSON [8502]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

Attorneys for Hanson Equipment, Inc.
Wells Fargo Center, 15th Floor
299 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
E-mail: gary-iohnson@rbmn.com
tawni-anderson@rbmn.com
zachary-peterson@rbmn.com
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801)531-2000
Fax No.: (801)532-5506

TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTION

2

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

2- 3

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3-7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

8-9

ARGUMENT

9-38

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

In Ruling On The Hills' Claims, The Trial Court Properly Limited
It's Analysis To The Allegations In Their Complaint

9-10

The Hills' Factual Allegations Regarding Liberty Mutual's Post-Investigation
Conduct Were Not Preserved For Appeal
10-11
The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed The Hills' Spoliation-Based
Claims Because They Did Not State Any Claim Under Which Relief
Could Be Granted

11-26

The Hills Cannot Meet The Required Elements Of Any Claim
For Intentional Interference

26-38

The Hills Failed To State A Claim Under Which Punitive
Damages Could Be Awarded

38

CONCLUSION

39

ADDENDUM

41

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1312 (Utah 1990)

30

Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36,1J65, 116 P.3d 323

17

Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough,
2003 UT 9, f53, 70 P.3d 17

9, 36

Bennett v. Town ofRiverhead, 940 F. Supp. 481, 492 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)

35

Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co

5

Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998)

12, 14, 15

DeBry v. Godbe, 992 P.2d 979, 986 (Utah 1999)

30

Dowdle Butane Gas Co., Inc. v. Moore, 831 So.2d 1124, 1135 (Miss. 2002)

16, 17

Glotzbach, CPA v. Froman, 854 N.E.2d 337 (Ind. 2006)

23

Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1308
(11th Cir. 2003)

17

Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 854 (D.C. 1998)

20

Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1988)

36

Koesel., Spoliation of Evidence at 89-90

13

Kopffv. World Research Group LLC, 519 F. Supp. 2d 97, 100 (D. D.C. 2007)

32

Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 1?>4 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Kan. 1987)
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982)

13
25, 26, 28

Lincoln Ins. Co. v. Home Emergency Servs., Inc., 812 So.2d 433, 435
(Fla. Ct. App. 2002)

17
ii

Lovelandv. Orem City Corp. , 746 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah 1987)

22

Mackayv. Cannon, 1999 UT App 36,^13, 996 P.2d 1081

8

Nix v. Hoke, 139 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D. D.C. 2001

6

Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11 (Mont. 1999)

18, 20

OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Howell, 864 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (D. Kan. 1994)

22, 24

Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 1997)

30

Puttuckv. Gendron, 2008 UT App 362, |23, 199 P.2d 971

9, 29

Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 868 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

12

Savage v. Educator's Ins. Co., 874 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

24

Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (1993)
Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)
Stokes v. Van Wagoner, 1999 UT 94, ^6, 987 P.2d 602
Temple Comm. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1999)

18, 34
12
8, 27
2
12, 14

Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund, 2003 UT App 438, \\2, 83 P.3d 391

21

Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 416, 424 (Idaho 1996)

22

Williams v. Bench, 2008 UT App 306, ^20, 193P.3d640

8

Wilson v. Colonial Penn. Life Ins., 454 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Minn. 1978)

31

Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 923 P.2d416 (1996)

32, 33

1

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78A-3-102 of the
Utah Code. By Order dated October 31, 2008, this Court vacated a prior pour-over to the
court of appeals and elected to retain this case on its docket. (R. 1278.)
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Utah does not recognize a cause of action for "spoliation" as an

independent tort. The Hills alleged in their Complaint that Liberty Mutual had spoliated
evidence and sought damages for the alleged spoliation. Did the trial court correctly
dismiss the Hills' Complaint for failure to state a claim under which relief could be
granted?
2.

The Hills did not state a claim for spoliation, even under the tests created by

the few jurisdictions that recognize spoliation as a cause of action, because they alleged
only that Liberty Mutual had "hindered" their case against Skyline. The Hills' allegations
also did not satisfy the elements of a traditional negligence analysis. Did the trial court
correctly dismiss the Hills' Complaint for failure to state a claim under which relief could
be granted?
3.

The Hills failed to state a claim for an intentional interference tort. The

majority of the Hills' arguments relate to spoliation; however, even under an intentional
interference tort, the Hills' complaint failed to present or preserve a claim under which
relief could be granted.
2

Standard of Review: The standard of review is the same for all issues presented.
Whether the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See Stokes
v. Van Wagoner, 1999 UT 94,1J6, 987 P.2d 602.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
None.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Procedural History

This is an appeal of two orders entered by the trial court, one on June 12, 2008 and
one on September 9, 2008. Both orders dismissed claims brought by the appellants,
Bruce Hills and Judith Hills ("the Hills"), for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
The procedural history of this case is rather convoluted. It began with a lawsuit
brought by the Hills against Skyline Electric Company ("Skyline"), which had performed
electrical work at Mark Hills' jobsite. Mark Hills was working for United Parcel Service
("UPS") when he was electrocuted and killed. (R. 0005.) The Hills brought suit against
Skyline, seeking damages for Mark Hills' wrongful death. (R. 0069-77.) This first
lawsuit has been referred to by the parties and trial courts involved as "Hills F\
Nearly a year after the Hills I complaint was filed, the Hills brought a second
action ("Hills IF) against Skyline; UPS; and Liberty Mutual, UPS's worker's
3

compensation carrier. In the Hills II Complaint, the Hills requested exactly the same
relief they had in Hills I—damages for Mark Hills' wrongful death—and also requested
damages for the loss of an electrical box wall mount. The Hills contended that the
defendants' spoliation of the wall mount "interfere[ed] with the Plaintiffs [sic] right to
bring Causes of Action [sic] resulting from the wrongful death of Mark D. Hills[,]" that
defendants had attempted to ''prevent the Plaintiffs from bringing an action against the
defendants[,]" and that defendants had acted *'for the purpose of hindering said
litigation." (R. 0001-24.)
Liberty Mutual and UPS immediately moved to dismiss the Hills //Complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim under which relief could be granted.
(R. 0053-83, 89-101.) The Hills //court eventually ordered that the two cases be
consolidated for purposes of discovery, and later ordered that the motions to dismiss be
stayed pending resolution of Hills I. (R. 595-598.)
Skyline later amended its answer in the Hills I case, admitting liability for Mark
Hills'death, but contesting damages. (R. 1084-88.) UPS and Liberty Mutual then
renewed their motions to dismiss, arguing that because Skyline had admitted liability, the
Hills could not show causation or damages. (R. 719-21, 722-24.) Several stages of
briefing and oral arguments ensued, culminating in the Hills //court's dismissal, through
two different orders, of all of the claims asserted in Hills II. (R. 1177-80, 1224-40.) It is
from those orders of dismissal that the Hills now appeal.

4

B.

Statement of Facts

Because this case hinges on the purely legal question of the sufficiency of the Hills
II Complaint, and because all of the facts alleged in that complaint must be accepted as
true, Liberty Mutual will give a basic outline of the salient facts.
The Hills' son, Mark Hills, was employed by UPS. (R. 0005.) Early in the
morning of August 19, 2003, Mark Hills was working as a package handler. (R. 0005-6.)
Because of faulty wiring that had been installed by Skyline, Mark was electrocuted and
died. (Id.) UPS, Liberty Mutual, and Skyline were involved in efforts to investigate the
cause of Mark's death. During the course of the investigation, a wall anchor that was part
of an electrical box—the box that apparently caused Mark's electrocution—was lost.
(R. 0008.) Following Utah Occupational Safety and Health's investigation, UPS was
fined for having lost the wall anchor. (R. 1235.)
The Hills I and Hills II cases ensued. After the two cases were consolidated for
discovery, and after a series of motions to dismiss, oral arguments, and supplemental
briefs, the Hills //court entered two orders which, combined, dismissed all of the claims
asserted in Hills II for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
In particular, the first order dismissed (a) Skyline's cross-claim against UPS; (b)
the Hills' negligence-based spoliation claims against all defendants; and (c) the Hills'
"intentional misconduct" claim against all defendants. (R. 1177-80.) In dismissing the
intentional misconduct claim, the Hills //court expressly dismissed the claims for
5

damages that duplicated those raised in Hills I (for example, loss of consortium, burial
expenses, and other damages sought in the wrongful death action). The court left open
the Hills' claims for any damages that might be found to flow from the alleged spoliation,
including punitive damages. (Id.)
The second order dismissed the remainder of the Hills' claims. In a lengthy and
detailed memorandum decision and order, the trial court first acknowledged that the
Hills' "intentional misconduct" and "tortuous [sic] interference" claims "appear to be
intentional spoliation of evidence claims and at the hearing sounded like abuse of process
claims." (R. 1226.) It noted that Utah law does not recognize a spoliation claim as
described by the Hills, but concluded that it would look at the substance, rather than the
labels, and that the Hills "appear to be claiming an independent tort of intentional
spoliation of evidence." (R. 1230 e.g. (R. 1230.))
The court found scant support for the Hills' suggestion that the first-party
evidentiary inference that was applied in Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co. 1 to remedy the
loss of evidence in a products liability case could be stretched to support an independent
cause of action seeking damages against a third party. (R. 1231.) Because there is no
spoliation test that has been adopted in Utah, the trial court applied a general negligence
analysis to the Hills' complaint. (R. 1232-33.) It noted that "[gjeneral tort law requires a
plaintiff to prove that a defendant proximately caused Plaintiff damages." (R, 1232.) To
make this showing, a plaintiff would have to prove that it was "'unsuccessful because of

1 Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
6

the absence of the destroyed evidence, or at the very least, that the destruction of the
evidence in question made pursuing the initial claim impossible'" and "'that the destroyed
evidence would have enabled plaintiff successfully to pursue the initial civil action.'" (R.
1233. (quoting Nix v. Hoke, 139 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D. D.C. 2001).)
Viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the Hills, the trial court
observed that "Skyline's recent admission of liability in Hills I clearly establishes that
Plaintiffs are successful in the [sic] proving liability in Hills /." (R. 1233. (emphasis in
original).) Although the Hills were seeking damages in Hills II, "[a]ny spoliation of
evidence by UPS and Liberty Mutual relates to proving liability, not damages. Because
liability is no longer an issue in Hills /, Plaintiffs' legal remedy is not affected by UPS
and Liberty Mutual's actions." (Id.) Because the Hills did not properly allege and could
not, under any set of facts, show that UPS and Liberty Mutual caused damages, the Hills
failed to state a claim under which relief could be granted. (Id.)
The trial court was equally unpersuaded by the Hills' contentions that the
spoliation "affected [their] probable expectancy in damages" because the damages for
Mark Hills' death "were frozen at the time of [his] death. Whatever damages Plaintiffs
are entitled to receive for [Mark Hills'] wrongful death will be determined in the Hills I
case between Plaintiffs and Skyline." (R. 1234.)
Similarly, the Hills' argument that "the delay created by UPS and Liberty Mutual's
acts diminished the value of their claim in Hills F was unsupported by any legal
authority. Furthermore, any suggestion that the defendants had delayed the Hills in
7

pursuit of their wrongful death claim stemmed solely from acts alleged to have occurred
after Mark Hills' death, which were not pleaded in the Hills' Complaint. (R. 1234.)
The trial court therefore dismissed the remainder of the Hills' claims in Hills II.
Facts Not Properly Before the Hills II Trial Court
The Hills II trial court allowed the Hills to submit additional facts and legal
theories that went beyond the facts alleged in the Hills II Complaint in an effort to
understand the Hills' somewhat murky damages claims that UPS and Liberty Mutual had
"hindered" the Hills' prosecution of their wrongful death case. Although the trial court
allowed these additional facts, the trial court confined its analysis to only the factual
allegations in the Hills' Complaint. Because this appeal does not present a challenge to
findings of fact, and because the analysis of a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is limited to the
legal sufficiency of the allegations pleaded in the complaint, Liberty Mutual will not go
into great detail in rebutting the shifting and amorphous "damage" claims made by the
Hills throughout the course of this litigation. A succinct rebuttal of the Hills' allegations
of "delay" and "impeding litigation" can be found in footnote 2 of the trial court's
September 9, 2008 Order and in the Affidavit of Taggart Hansen. (R. 1229., 845-1088.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court correctly ruled that the Hills' Complaint failed to state any claims
on which relief could be granted. The Hills alleged that the defendants, including Liberty
Mutual, had somehow prevented them from pursuing a wrongful death case against
Skyline, even though they had filed that case almost a year before they filed the complaint
8

in Hills IL The Hills also alleged that the defendants had somehow delayed or hindered
their prosecution of Hills I. Even accepting all of the Hills5 factual allegations as true,
however, they failed to state any claims for relief that are cognizable under Utah law.
Moreover, even if the Hills' factual allegations are analyzed under tests adopted by a
small minority of jurisdictions, they still failed to state any claim upon which relief could
be granted.

ARGUMENT
I.

IN RULING ON THE HILLS' CLAIMS, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
LIMITED ITS ANALYSIS TO THE ALLEGATIONS IN THEIR
COMPLAINT
The trial court properly concluded that the Hills' complaint failed to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted. "A rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss admits the facts
alleged in the complaint but challenges the plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts."
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991).
Interpreting this standard, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that dismissal is appropriate
when, assuming the factual assertions in the complaint are correct, a party has failed to
allege sufficient facts to meet all the elements of a claim. See Mackay v. Cannon, 1999
UT App 36, ^13, 996 P.2d 1081. "[I]n deciding the propriety of a rule 12(b)(6) motion,
trial courts are obliged to address the legal viability of a plaintiff s underlying claim as
presented in the pleadings." Williams v. Bench, 2008 UT App 306, ^[20, 193 P.3d 640. In
Williams, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff s negligence claim,
finding that plaintiff could prove no set of facts that would demonstrate a legal duty of
9

care was owed to her. See id. at ^|25 (although plaintiff alleged the existence of a legal
duty, the court concluded that Utah law did not recognize a duty of care absent some
special relationship that plaintiff had not alleged).
When reviewing the allegations in the Hills' Complaint, this Court must accept as
true only the well-pleaded factual allegations. The sufficiency of the Hills' Complaint
must be based on the facts pleaded rather than the conclusions that are stated. See
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9,1J60, 70 P.3d 17. In
making its ruling, the trial court properly declined to consider factual allegations that
were not part of the Hills' Complaint and properly limited its analysis to only the wellpleaded facts in the Complaint.
IL

THE HILLS' FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING LIBERTY
MUTUAL'S POST-INVESTIGATION CONDUCT WERE NOT
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL
Although the Hills' brief is filled with allegations about defendants' improper acts

with respect to the litigation and discovery in this case, this Court should not consider
these facts, allegations, or legal theories. As the trial court properly noted, the Hills
raised these allegations only in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss and the
allegations are not contained their Complaint. (R. at 1228-29 n.2.) Accordingly, the trial
court properly reviewed only the allegations in the Complaint to determine whether,
taking the allegations as true, the Complaint stated a claim for which relief could be
granted.
In addition, the Hills never moved to amend the Complaint. They made no oral
argument that the Complaint should be amended and failed to submit a formal written
10

motion to amend the complaint. See Puttuck v. Gendron, 2008 UT App 362, ^[23, 199
P.2d 971 (stating that in order to properly move to amend a pleading, a party must submit
a written motion and a supporting memorandum providing the grounds for the motion and
the relief sought). Because the Hills failed to properly move to amend the complaint and
because the trial court properly declined to consider any new facts or new theories in
ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss, the new facts and new theories were not
preserved for appellate review and are not properly before this Court on appeal.
Accordingly, this Court should not consider plaintiffs' allegations relating to events that
occurred after the investigation of the accident.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE HILLS'
SPOLIATION-BASED CLAIMS BECAUSE THEY DID NOT STATE ANY
CLAIM UNDER WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED
The trial court correctly perceived that the substance, if not the labels applied to,

the Hills' claims for relief "appear to be intentional spoliation of evidence claims".
(R. 1226.) Taking all the facts that were pleaded by the Hills as true, the trial court
correctly concluded that the fact that the Hills established Skyline's liability in Hills I
meant that under no state of the law could the Hills recover.
This Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of the Hills' spoliation claims,
however they are described, for at least two reasons. First, "spoliation" is not a
recognized cause of action under Utah law. Accordingly, the spoliation claims pleaded
by the Hills failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Second, even if
this Court recognizes spoliation as an independent tort, the Hills' Complaint failed to
11

allege facts that would satisfy the requirements of the cause of action, whether it is
analyzed under the test for spoliation as an independent cause of action or under a
traditional negligence analysis.
Interestingly, the Hills' opening brief on appeal completely avoids any
examination of the facts pleaded in the Complaint and whether those facts are sufficient
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Instead, most of the brief is devoted
to a description of spoliation as a cause of action (one that has been recognized by only a
small number of jurisdictions that have considered it), combined with lengthy assertions
of alleged fact that were never raised in the Complaint. Liberty Mutual will briefly
discuss the contours of spoliation as an independent tort (as well as the reasons why most
jurisdictions have rejected the tort), and then show, by reference to the Hills' Complaint,
that the facts alleged cannot meet the elements of negligent or intentional spoliation.
A.

UTAH LAW DOES NOT RECOGNIZE SPOLIATION AS AN
INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION. FOR THE SAME REASONS
THAT MOST COURTS HAVE REJECTED SPOLIATION AS A TORT,
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO RECOGNIZE THE CAUSE OF
ACTION.

In support of their arguments that the tort of spoliation should be recognized in
Utah, the Hills blend and blur various other doctrines related to intentional interferencetype torts and suggest at times that these other torts support recognizing spoliation as a
cause of action in Utah. At other points, they have argued that they are not truly alleging
"spoliation" and have seemed to imply that that label has been unwillingly foisted upon
them. {See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 11 (describing "original claims for relief as unow deemed
causes of action in spoliation").) As the Hills have explicitly acknowledged, though, and
12

as the trial court correctly concluded, the causes of action alleged by the Hills are
substantively based on the theory of spoliation as a tort. See Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d
864, 868 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("In characterizing a cause of action, Utah courts look to
the nature of the action and not the pleading labels chosen."). In particular, the Hills'
focus has been on an intentional, rather than negligent, tort.
Only a handful of states recognize spoliation as an independent cause of action,
and nearly all states that have considered the question have rejected the position advanced
by the Hills and have instead concluded that traditional negligence principles and other
remedies are sufficient to deter and punish spoliation without the significant downside
that the independent tort carries. See, e.g., Christian v. Kenneth Chandler Constr. Co.,
658 So.2d 408, 413 (Ala. 1995); Goffv. Harold Ives Trucking Co., Inc., 27 S.W.3d 387,
391 (Ark. 2000) (collecting cases); Dowdle Butane Gas Co., Inc. v. Moore, 831 So.2d
1124 (Miss. 2002) (collecting cases); Elias v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 67 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1998); Margaret M. Koesel et al., Spoliation of Evidence: Sanctions and
Remedies for Destruction of Evidence in Civil Litigation 81, 83 (American Bar Ass'n
2006).
California was an early adopter of the tort, and its Smith opinion is relied on by the
few states that followed California's lead. See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr.
829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). But just more than a decade after Smith, California abandoned
the cause of action because of the problems inherent in the "tort." See Temple Comm.
Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1999) (holding no cause of action for third13

party spoliation); Cedars-Sinai Med Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998)
(holding no cause of action for first-party spoliation). Other states have recognized these
same difficulties.2 The problems recognized by other jurisdictions would work similar
mischief if the cause of action were recognized in Utah.
1.

Uncertainty of Damages

The most problematic issue is that damages are so inherently uncertain in a
spoliation action that most courts conclude they are all but impossible to ascertain.
Koesel at 85. This is because "there is no way to establish with certainty what the
missing evidence would have shown and the 'inherent difficulty of proving the fact of
injury.'" Koesel at 85 (quoting Sean R. Levine, Note, Spoliation of Evidence in West
Virginia: Do Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth?, 104 W. Va. L. Rev. 419, 438 (Winter
2002)).
Concerns about the impossibility of proving damages are perhaps even greater in
third-party situations such as that presented by this case. For example, spoliation might
injure both parties in the underlying litigation, which could then create two claims with

2 These potential problems were neatly summarized by the Kansas Supreme Court early
in the development of spoliation cases as including
the generation of endless litigation [ . . . ; ] inconsistency with
the intent of the workers' compensation laws; rank
speculation as to whether the plaintiff could have ever
recovered in the underlying action and, if so, the speculative
nature of the damages; the limitless scope of the new duty
which would be created; and the unwarranted intrusion on the
property rights of a person who lawfully disposes of his own
property.
Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Kan. 1987).
14

verdicts that could be duplicative or inconsistent. See Temple, 976 P.2d at 232. Or, as is
precisely the situation in this appeal, "the plaintiff in the underlying litigation may claim
that but for the spoliation, his or her recovery would have been greater." Id.
In this case, it is uncertain what measure of damages the Hills could possibly
claim, or how damages could be determined by a finder of fact. The damages for Mark
Hills' death were fixed at the moment he died; the purported damages caused by
appellees' "delays" were nothing more than typical delays that are inherent in the
litigation process and are not actionable (but most importantly, they were not pleaded in
the Complaint).3 Nor have the Hills been clear about the damages sought. They are
asking for damages identical to those requested in Hills I for Mark Hills' wrongful death.
They are asking for punitive damages. And at times, they seem to concede that the only
measure of damages might be limited to certain costs in the Hills I litigation. (Br. Aplt.
at 20.)
In fact, the Hills have suffered no damages. As discussed below, Skyline has
admitted its negligence in Hills /, and the only issue remaining is the amount of damages
suffered as a result of Mark Hill's death. This is properly determined in Hills I. The
spoliation alleged in Hills II did nothing to prevent the Hills from making their wrongful

3 "From reviewing the facts in the Complaint and those additional facts in the briefs and
even viewing those facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court is not persuaded
that Defendants did anything more than defend their respective interests and participate in
the legal process. Wrongful death cases, by their very nature are cases that generally do
not resolve quickly." (R. 1228-29 n.2.) This finding is amply supported by the record
(see, e.g., Hansen Affidavit, R. 845-1088), and the Hills have not marshaled the evidence
to challenge the finding.
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death claim. Moreover, the Hills were not prevented from fully articulating their case in
Hills I; they were not hindered or impeded in any way because the facts alleged in Hills II
are the same as those known to the Hills at the time they filed their complaint in Hills I;
the Hills II case presented no new facts.
2.

Creation of Needless Litigation

When it did away with the first-party cause of action for spoliation, the California
Supreme Court noted that "using tort law to correct misconduct arising during litigation
raises policy considerations not present in deciding whether to create tort remedies for
harms arising in other contexts." Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 515. For that reason, the
court has "favored remedying litigation-related misconduct by sanctions imposed within
the underlying lawsuit rather than by creating new derivative torts." Id. Encouraging the
use of sanctions, rather than further litigation, also promotes the finality of judgments. Id.
at 515-16. Moreover, this approach is consistent with the policy of not allowing tort
actions for analogous acts, such as witnesses who commit perjury, conceal evidence, or
withhold evidence. See id.
Allowing plaintiffs to litigate spoliation claims as separate causes of action in
different suits also creates a system of potentially endless litigation, a scenario that was
best described by the California Supreme Court when it rejected third-party causes of
action for spoliation.
The spoliation tort not only would provide the disappointed
litigant a second opportunity to seek compensation, it would
require retrial of the first case in order to permit the plaintiff
to demonstrate in what respect the alleged spoliation altered
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the outcome of the first trial. Indeed, the matter might still
continue, for spoliation in the second trial might give rise to
yet a third lawsuit.
Temple Comm. Hosp., 976 P.2d at 229. These multiple suits would also "give rise to a
'significant potential for jury confusion and inconsistency.'" Temple, 976 P.2d at 229
(quoting Cedars-Sinai).
3.

Adequacy of Available Remedies to Deter and Punish Spoliation

"The infrequency of spoliation suggests that existing remedies are generally
effective at deterring spoliation." Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 518. Among the existing
remedies relied on by many courts are evidentiary inferences, sanctions for misconduct
during discovery, disciplinary sanctions against attorneys, and even criminal penalties.
Similar remedies are available under Utah law and, as in other states, these remedies are
adequate to deter and punish spoliation without creating a new, independent tort.
For example, Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets out a variety of
sanctions for failure to comply with discovery, including evidentiary inferences, default
judgments or dismissals against the offending party, ordering the payment of costs and
even attorney fees, and holding the offender in contempt of court. Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b).
In addition, Rule 37(g) makes clear that the court has "inherent power" to enter any
sanctions "if a party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers with or fails to preserve a
document, tangible item, electronic data or other evidence in violation of a duty." Id. R.
37(g). And section 76-8-510.5 provides criminal penalties for tampering with evidence.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510.5.
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"[A]s the California courts learned after 14 years of experience with this tort, any
benefits obtained by recognizing the spoliation tort are outweighed by the burdens
imposed." Dow die Butane Gas Co., Inc. v. Moore, 831 So.2d 1124, 1135 (Miss. 2002).
This Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of the Hills' claims and decline to
recognize this "burdensome and inaccurate instrument of derivative tort litigation" as
have the vast majority of courts that have considered the issue. Dowdle, 831 So.2d at
1132.
B.

EVEN IF THIS COURT RECOGNIZES SPOLIATION AS A CAUSE OF
ACTION, THE HILLS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR
SPOLIATION UNDER WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED

Whether analyzed under the schema developed by the few courts that recognize
spoliation or whether analyzed under traditional negligence doctrines, the Hills failed to
state claims under which relief could be granted. Accordingly, the trial court correctly
dismissed the Hills' claims for "spoliation," howsoever denominated, and the trial court's
rulings should be affirmed by this Court.
1.

The Hills Cannot Show That the Spoliation Caused Damages

Virtually every court considering the question has concluded that spoliation
damages are available only if the plaintiff can prove that the spoliation caused the loss of
the underlying lawsuit. See, e.g., Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
341 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (applying Florida law and stating plaintiffs "must
'demonstrate that [they] were unable to prove [their] underlying action owing to the
unavailability of the evidence" (quoting Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So.2d 313,
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315 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1990)); Kolanovic v. Gida, 77 F. Supp. 595 (D. NJ. 1999) ("'If
plaintiff prevails on his underlying cause of action, there are no damages resulting from
the destruction of the evidence.'" (Citation omitted.)); Lincoln Ins. Co. v. Home
Emergency Servs., Inc., 812 So.2d 433, 435 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing tort "where
a party is unable to prove their cause due to the loss or destruction of key evidence.. . .
[a] spoliation claim . . . compensates the plaintiff for the loss of recovery in the
underlying case due to the plaintiffs inability to prove the case because of the lost or
destroyed evidence" (emphasis added)); Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11
(Mont. 1999)
Although the Hills' factual allegations, legal theories, and damages claims have
remained floating targets throughout the briefing and argument of this case below,
Liberty assumes that the Hills' primary objective is to press theories of intentional tort in
the hopes of being awarded punitive damages. But because plaintiffs have pleaded both
negligent and intentional tort theories, Liberty will address the Hills' spoliation arguments
under both theories.
2.

The Hills Failed to State a Claim for Intentional Spoliation As An
Independent Cause of Action

Although the wording of the tests varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, in
general the elements for a claim of intentional spoliation are "(i) pending or probable
litigation involving the plaintiff, (ii) knowledge on the part of defendant that litigation
exists or is probable, (iii) willful destruction of evidence by defendant designed to disrupt
plaintiffs case, (iv) disruption of the plaintiffs case, and (v) damages proximately caused
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by the defendant's acts[.]" Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio
1993); Margaret M. Koesel et al., Spoliation of Evidence: Sanctions and Remedies for
Destruction of Evidence in Civil Litigation 88-89 (American Bar Ass'n 2006). As the
Hills acknowledge, the most consistent elements of the various spoliation tests are those
requiring the plaintiffs to prove (a) causation and (b) that they were unable to pursue their
underlying suit. (Aplt. Br. at 17.)
The Hills' Complaint pleads only the following facts regarding causation and
damages: by engaging in the alleged spoliation the defendants "interferefed] with the
Plaintiffs [sic] right to bring Causes of Action [sic] resulting from the wrongful death of
Mark D. Hills[,]" attempted to "prevent the Plaintiffs from bringing an action against the
defendants[,]" and acted "for the purpose of hindering said litigation." (R. 0015,
0017-18,0020-21.)
Those allegations simply do not raise a claim upon which relief could be granted.
First, the Hills' "right to bring causes of action" was not "interfered with" in any way; in
fact, their wrongful death suit was filed nearly a year before Hills II, and was based on
identical facts and information. Second, nothing in the Complaint supports the allegation
that the defendants tried to "prevent" the Hills from filing suit in Hills L4 Finally, the
allegation that the defendants intended to "hinder" the litigation is unsupported by the

4 Nor would such a proposition make any sense. As UPS' workers' compensation carrier
, Liberty Mutual paid benefits to Mark Hills' estate and would have subrogation rights
against any recovery made by the estate. It would therefore be in Liberty Mutual's
interest to have the plaintiffs sue Skyline.
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facts pleaded, is undermined by the unavailability of a legal remedy for this claimed
harm, and is fatally undermined by the fact that Skyline admitted liability in Hills L The
Hills were fully able to file suit and prosecute their claims against Skyline, and in fact
were successful at establishing Skyline's liability.
3.

The Hills Failed to State a Claim for Negligent Spoliation As An
Independent Cause of Action

As with intentional spoliation, although there is no universally-agreed upon test for
negligent spoliation the courts that recognize the tort use essentially the same test. To
prove negligent spoliation, a plaintiff must show:
(1) [the] existence of a potential civil action; (2) a legal or
contractual duty to preserve evidence which is relevant to that
action; (3) destruction of that evidence . .. ; (4) significant
impairment in the ability to prove the potential civil action;
(5) a proximate relationship between the impairment of the
underlying suit and the unavailability of the destroyed
evidence; (6) a significant possibility of success of the
potential civil action if the evidence were available; and (7)
damages adjusted for the estimated likelihood of success in
the potential civil action.
Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 854 (D.C. 1998); Oliver, 993 P.2d at 19;
Koesel., Spoliation of Evidence at 89-90.
Even accepting all of the Hills' well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true,
the Hills failed to state a claim under which relief could be granted. The Hills II
Complaint alleges only that defendants' loss of the wall mount interfered with the Hills'
"right to bring Causes of Action [sic,]" that the defendants attempted to "prevent the
Plaintiffs from bringing an action against the defendants[,]" and that defendants acted
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"for the purpose of hindering said litigation." (R. 0015, 0017-18, 0020-21.)
The facts alleged in the Hills' Complaint simply cannot show "a significant
impairment in the ability to prove" Hills /, because in fact the Hills did prove their lawsuit
in the underlying case. The parties conducted discovery, and after the depositions of
certain witnesses Skyline conceded its liability. The Hills have effectively prevailed in
Hills I; the only matter left to determine is the amount of their damages, which were fixed
at the moment of Mark Hills' death.
The Hills' claims that appellees collectively have somehow increased the cost of
their prosecuting Hills I are of no avail. First, on appeal the Hills have not challenged the
trial court's ancillary fmding5 that any alleged delays were merely inherent to the nature
of litigating a wrongful death suit. But most importantly, the Hills did not plead any of
these facts in the Hills II Complaint, and the matter was not properly before the trial court
in its Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.
4.

The Hills Failed to State a Claim Under a Traditional Negligence
Analysis
Most courts that have been presented with claims for spoliation as a stand-alone
tort have rejected that approach and have, instead, analyzed the claims under a traditional
negligence approach. If this Court chooses not to recognize spoliation as an independent
tort, it should still affirm the trial court's conclusion that the Hills failed to state a claim

5 Liberty Mutual describes this as an "ancillary" finding because it was not essential to
the trial court's legal conclusions regarding the sufficiency of the Hills' Complaint.
Although the trial court considered the Hansen Affidavit and concluded that the
defendants had not delayed or hindered the Hills' prosecution of their case, the trial court
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upon which relief could be granted under a traditional negligence analysis.
To show that Liberty was liable in negligence, the Hills would have to prove that
"the defendant owned plaintiff a duty, that the defendant breached that duty, that the
breach of duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, and that the plaintiff in
fact suffered injuries or damages." Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund, 2003 UT App 438,
^[12, 83 P.3d 391. Even accepting their factual allegations as true, for the reasons
discussed above the Hills' Complaint did not state actionable claims for causation and
damages. The trial court therefore correctly dismissed the Complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6).
Although the Hills assert a claim for negligence, the factual allegations in the
Complaint allege intentional conduct on the part of Liberty Mutual. When faced with
allegations of intentional conduct and a negligence claim, courts have noted the
inconsistency between intentional conduct that yielded an intended result and a
negligence claim. See, e.g., Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 416, 424 (Idaho
1996) (declining to consider negligence claim because factual allegations were of
intentional conduct); OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Howell, 864 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (D. Kan.
1994) (claim of embracery requires intentional conduct which is not consistent with claim
of negligence). Because the Hills have alleged Liberty Mutual intentionally spoliated
evidence and intentionally conspired to conceal its acts, the trial court correctly dismissed
the Hills' negligence-based claims against Liberty Mutual.

did not rely on any of these facts because they were not pleaded in the Hills' Complaint
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Moreover, the Hills did not oppose Liberty Mutual's motion to dismiss on
negligence and have therefore failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Before the trial
court, Liberty Mutual did not rely on the exclusive remedy bar under the Workers'
Compensation Statute to defend against the negligence claim. Rather, Liberty Mutual
argued that the Hills' Complaint had not established a legal duty between them and
Liberty Mutual.
It is "axiomatic that one may not be liable to another in tort absent a duty."
Lovelandv. Orem City Corp. , 746 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah 1987). The determination of the
existence of a duty is a legal question for the trial court. Id. at 766. According to the
Hills, the duties that Liberty Mutual allegedly breached were duties to preserve the
equipment, materials, or evidence pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark
Hills, duties that were imposed on Liberty Mutual by Utah OSHA ("UOSHA"), the Utah
Labor Commission, or related laws. Such an allegation is fatal to the Hills' claim because
the duty arising from an instruction to preserve evidence issued by UOSHA (if applicable
to Liberty Mutual) does not run to the Hills, but rather runs to UOSHA. In analyzing the
duty issue, this Court should remember that Liberty Mutual was not Mark Hills'
employer, and it did not own the premises or control the property at the accident site.
In Glotzbach, CPA v. Froman, 854 N.E.2d 337 (Ind. 2006), a company called
Midwest Material Services provided environmental cleanup and the handling and transfer
of hazardous materials as a service to its customers. Midwest was engaged to clean a

(R. 1228-29 n.2.)
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large holding tank for Ashland Chemical and William Darling, one of Midwest's owners,
working with Drew Froman, began emptying the tank using an electric pump and other
equipment. There was an explosion that caused fatal burns to Froman. See id at 338.
A few days after the explosion, the Indiana Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("IOSHA") contacted Darling to confirm that he still had possession of
the pump, and instructed him not to dispose of it. Four days later, when IOSHA and the
Fire Department contacted Darling, he reported that everything he had collected from the
site had been thrown away. Froman's estate filed a wrongful death complaint against
Midwest and the "John Doe" manufacturer of the pump, but later amended the complaint
to state a claim for negligent and intentional spoliation of evidence against Midwest.
On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court noted that the plaintiffs were asserting that
IOSHA's instructions to Darling to retain the pump created the kind of necessary special
relationship between the parties to establish a duty on Darling's part to preserve the
evidence. The Indiana Supreme Court, however, rejected that argument. The Court
noted that "IOSHA's instruction to retain the debris made no reference to the need to
preserve the evidence for Froman's use in private litigation. Otherwise stated, to the
extent IOSHA's request created any duty to preserve the evidence, it was a duty owed to
IOSHA, not to Froman or his estate." Id. at 340.
Similarly, any instructions that UOSHA may have given to any representative of
Liberty Mutual would not create or impose upon Liberty Mutual any duty running to the
plaintiffs in this case. If any kind of duty could be contemplated (and, again given
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Liberty Mutual's lack of ownership or control, it is questionable a duty arises), it would
be a duty Liberty Mutual owed to UOSHA, not to the Hills. See also OMI Holdings,
Inc. v. Howell, 864 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (D. Kan. 1994) (holding court's instructions to
expert witness to avoid communication with jurors did not create duty flowing to
opposing party, the breach of which would be actionable).
No special duty of care existed between Liberty Mutual and the Hills. This
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that in Utah, a worker's compensation insurer owes
no duty of good faith to an injured employee, but rather the duty runs to the employer,
with whom the carrier is in privity of contract. See Savage v. Educator's Ins. Co., 874
P.2d 130 (Utah Ct.App. 1994).
After Liberty Mutual briefed this issue to the trial court, the Hills failed to oppose
Liberty Mutual's separate motion to dismiss. The Hills' Complaint does not establish the
required elements of negligence, and the Hills have failed to preserve this issue for
appellate review.
IV.

THE HILLS CANNOT MEET THE REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF ANY
CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE
A.

INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE

Although the Hills do not argue any claims for intentional interference with
economic relations as outlined in Leigh Furniture in their appellate brief, out of an
abundance of caution Liberty Mutual will address this tort because the Complaint
identifies intentional conduct and a tort claim. The Hills' brief cites to Leigh Furniture
and the elements of the intentional interference tort in order to argue that the analytical
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leap from the recognized intentional interference tort to a spoliation tort is not too great
and Utah should recognize a spoliation cause of action. (Br. Aplt. at 24.) Although the
Hills do not argue that they have a claim for intentional interference with economic
relations, they argue that they could meet the required elements of the claim because:
Appellees (1) intentionally interfered with evidence
Appellants needed to pursue an underlying suit, as
demonstrated by the willful violation OSHA initially issued;
(2) Appellants [sic] effected such actions for an improper
purpose, to hide the cause of the electrocution; and (3) the
acts caused harm to Appellants by forcing Appellants' to file
an action for spoliation given the uncertainty of causation and
the viability of proving the underlying Hills I suit, and
secondarily, harmed Appellants with the expense of litigating
with non-party UPS to compel discovery in Hills I of the
OSHA accident report (UPS had restricted OSHA from
releasing the report. (R. at 825-27).); and the expense and
time of litigating with UPS to compel the Heath Engineering
reports and Heath Engineering personal [sic] responsible for
evidence alteration and destruction. (R. at 913-927).
(Br. Aplt. at 24.)
In this argument, however, the Hills have used both the allegations in the
complaint and additional factual elements relating to conduct after litigation had started.
As discussed above, the allegations of post-litigation conduct used to satisfy the third
prong are not in the Complaint and should not be considered in reviewing the trial court's
Order. Indeed, the trial court stated that the additional facts were improperly raised in
opposition to the motion to dismiss, and it would not consider "these additional facts and
new theory." (R. at 1228-29 n.2)
Even assuming the argument was preserved for appeal, the Complaint does not
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satisfy the elements of an intentional interference claim. In order to assert a claim for
intentional interference, the Hills must prove the following elements: "(I) that the
defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic
relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the
plaintiff." Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). The
Hills have failed to allege how Liberty Mutual interfered with their existing or potential
economic relations. They filed Hills /prior to initiating Hills II, and they knew all of the
facts concerning the electrocution and the investigation into the cause of the electrocution
before filing Hills L
The Hills have failed to allege that Liberty Mutual's acts prevented them from
filing a complaint in Hills /, caused them to miss a statute of limitations, or caused a
defendant in Hills Ho become insolvent or judgment proof. With Skyline Electric's
admission of liability, the Hills have only to prove their damages—a required element of
any cause of action. As the trial court correctly noted, the damages for a wrongful death
were fixed at the moment of death. Thus, the allegations in the Hills' Complaint fail to
allege how Liberty Mutual intentionally interfered with an existing or potential economic
relation. In fact, Hills //was nothing more than alternative action in the event the
spoliation precluded the Hills from being able to prove liability in Hills L Since liability
is not in dispute, the Hills cannot point to any interference with an existing or potential
economic relation. They will be able to recover whatever damages can be proved in
Hills I
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Under the second prong, the Hills argue that Liberty Mutual acted with an
improper purpose as required by Leigh Furniture. (Br. Aplt. at 24.) Interpreting this
prong, this Court stated: "Improper purpose is established by a showing that the actor's
predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff." St. Benedict's, 811 P.2d at 201. Thus,
even though a defendant's acts may injure the plaintiff, the plaintiff is required to
demonstrate that predominant motivation behind the act was to injure the plaintiff and not
some other legitimate reason. See id. In St. Benedict's, the hospital and a developer
solicited tenants from another office building with which the hospital had a contractual
agreement to find tenants. The developer of the other building sued the hospital and
argued that the hospital had improperly solicited its tenants and harmed it. This Court
determined the hospital had a legitimate economic interest in soliciting the tenants and
thus, its acts were not predominantly to injure the other building developer. See id.
In this matter, the Hills cannot demonstrate and did not allege that UPS's or
Liberty Mutuai's acts in investigating the cause of the electrocution were motivated by a
desire to harm the Hills. Mark Hills had already been electrocuted. As his employer,
UPS was not subject to a tort claim. Liberty Mutual was already responsible for any
workers' compensation benefits. The investigation was done to determine the cause of
the accident and to prevent others from being injured. The investigation was not done to
prevent a wrongful death claim against a third party for which UPS and Liberty Mutual
had no responsibility.
In addition, the Hills' claim would also fail because they cannot demonstrate the
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final prongs of causation or damages. See, e.g., Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 305-06. As
the trial court noted, the damages for a wrongful death claim were fixed at the moment of
death. None of defendants' acts could affect the amount of these damages. Since Skyline
has admitted liability, none of defendants' acts affected the Hills' right to recover these
damages. Accordingly, any act of spoliation had no effect on the Hills' economic
expectancy, which was fixed at the moment Mark Hills was electrocuted.
B.

INTERFERENCE WITH A CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

A b use of process

The Hills argue that Liberty Mutual has intentionally interfered with their right to
bring a cause of action, but they have never identified a specific cause of action that Utah
recognizes on this issue. The trial court noted that the claim sounded like one for abuse
of process. As noted above, any claim for abuse of process is not supported by the
allegations in plaintiffs' complaint. Moreover, plaintiffs could not satisfy the required
elements of this claim.
In order to state a claim for abuse of process, plaintiffs "must demonstrate first, an
ulterior purpose; [and] second, an act in the use of process not proper in the regular
prosecution of the proceedings." Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ^65, 116
P.3d 323. "This ulterior purpose usually involves 4coerci[ng another through use of
process] to obtain [something] . . . such as the surrender of property or payment of money,
or 'compelling [the] victim to do something which he would not otherwise be legally
obligated to do." Puttuck, 2008 UT App 362 at ^[14 (alterations in original) (citation
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omitted).
The Hills' new and unsubstantiated factual allegations merely accuse defendants of
causing them delay in the litigation of Hills L This allegation is not sufficient to
demonstrate interference with a cause of action under Utah law. Here, appellants filed
the Hills II Complaint in August of 2005, Liberty Mutual filed its Motion to Dismiss in
November of 2005, and Skyline cross-claimed against UPS, which moved to dismiss the
cross-claim. Oral argument was heard on all pending motions in April 2006, which
resulted in more briefing and Skyline's Motion to Consolidate Hills I and Hills II. Judge
Hansen then recused himself, resulting in additional delay. However, it is clear under
Utah law that even if Liberty Mutual's defense of Hills //had some collateral negative
effect on the Hills, such as the expenditure of time, of resources, or emotional strain, that
is not sufficient to state a cause of action for abuse of process. See Bennett v. Jones,
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, f 53, 70 P.3d 17.
The Hills have not alleged any other facts about how Liberty Mutual has misused
the litigation process. Specifically, none of the defendants initiated the litigation or filed
counterclaims against plaintiffs. As the trial court noted, the Hills filed no motions to
compel and no motions for sanctions. In short, the Hills have not alleged any facts that
would rise to the level of abuse of process.
2.

Judicial Proceeding Privilege

In addition, the judicial proceeding privilege recognizes that the statements of
attorneys, parties, judges, witnesses, and other participants in the judicial process enjoy an
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absolute privilege against liability for torts if the statements are made during or
preliminary to a judicial proceeding. Three elements must be satisfied for the privilege to
apply: 1) "the statement must have been made during or in the course of a judicial
proceeding; 2) the statement must have some reference to the subject matter of the
proceeding; and 3) the statement must have been made by someone acting in the capacity
of judge, jury, witness, litigant or counsel." Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Utah
1997).
The Hills' claims against Liberty Mutual would be encompassed by these three
elements. Assuming defendants' post-litigation conduct was properly pleaded, these acts
fall within the broad language of "in the course of a judicial proceeding." Price, 949 P.2d
at 1256-57. Similarly, the requirement of "referencing the subject matter" is read
expansively and includes any reference to the judicial proceeding, regardless of whether
the reference is material. See Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1312 (Utah 1990).
The application of the judicial privilege is not limited to defamatory remarks. In
Price, the privilege was applied to claims for intentional interference with business
relations. In DeBry v. Godbe, 992 P.2d 979, 986 (Utah 1999), this Court applied the
privilege to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The privilege would
also encompass the novel claims now advanced by the Hills.
Although Liberty Mutual cannot identify exactly what post-litigation conduct
allegedly hindered or interfered with plaintiffs' legal process, such claims would have
been in anticipation of the litigation or made after Hills I was filed, and, therefore, the
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judicial privilege would apply.
3.

Interference With a Cause of Action

Other jurisdictions have wrestled with a claim for interference with a cause of
action, and each has declined to adopt the cause of action. For example, In Wilson v.
Colonial Penn Life Ins., 454 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Minn. 1978), May Wilson sued her health
insurer, Colonial Penn, for its denial of benefits for her hospital stay. The Amended
Complaint stated four causes of action: 1) breach of the hospital indemnity insurance
contract; 2) a claim for tortious interference with the physician/patient relationship and
tortious interference with legal process; 3) intentional infliction of emotional distress/bad
faith; and 4) invasion of privacy. In dismissing the various tort actions and remanding the
case, the court directly analyzed the tortious interference with legal process claim. "First,
the court is aware of no reported case nor any treatise which recognizes the cause of
action sounding in tort denominated as interference with legal process." Id, at 1211.
Second, the court observed that the facts of the case did not support such a claim,
even if the court were to recognize it because the interference6 occurred prior to the
initiation of the lawsuit and, therefore, would fail to support the claim. More important to
this Court's analysis, however, is the following reasoning:
Likewise, even if Count II were to be construed as a claim
that the defendants somehow caused the plaintiffs to delay
their commencement of this action, it would still be subject to
dismissal for failure to state a claim. It is true that Count II
could be construed to allege that the defendants' actions
6 The insurer was accused of intimidating the treating physician and the hospital into not
producing records that substantiated plaintiffs treatment.
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caused the plaintiffs to delay their bringing an action to
enforce their rights under the insurance policy. However,
there is no allegation that the delay resulted in some rights
being barred by the statute of limitations or that the insurance
company had become insolvent and the value of the plaintiffs'
claim against the company was thereby diminished. Mere
delay without other injury is not actionable.
Id. at 1212 (emphasis added); see also Kopffv. World Research Group LLC, 519 F. Supp.
2d 97, 100 (D.D.C. 2007).
The Idaho Supreme Court also wrestled with the concept of intentional
interference with prospective civil action in Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 923 P.2d
416 (1996). This was a tort action brought against Hartford for its alleged misconduct in
investigating and litigating a wrongful death claim brought against its insured, the City of
McCall ("McCall"). The Yoakums' son died when the McCall golf course maintenance
vehicle he was riding in tipped over during a turn.
An employee of the Idaho State Police (Thompson) conducted an accident
investigation and concluded that the vehicle was unsafe to operate at any speed. Shortly
after this, Thompson left his employment with the Idaho State Police. Hartford then hired
Thompson and had him actually drive the vehicle, which he had not driven when writing
his original report. Id. at 419. Thompson determined that he had made an error in his
original calculation and changed his original opinion, now favoring McCall. Meanwhile,
Hartford's claim manager had allegedly been trying to intimidate the driver of the golf
course vehicle.
The Yoakums filed a lawsuit against Hartford alleging civil rights violations, a
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racketeering claim, and various intentional torts. The trial court granted Hartford's
summary judgment motion and on appeal, and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. In the
course of the court's analysis, although it could find no basis for the plaintiffs' spoliation
claim, it took the opportunity to opine on a cause of action for intentional interference
with a prospective legal claim. Id. at 423-24. The court observed that although such a
claim was not confined solely to the spoliation of evidence, "a claim for intentional
interference with a prospective civil action must nonetheless allege and prove conduct
that amounts to an unreasonable interference by the defendant, taking into account any
recognized privileges that party may hold." Id. at 424. Because the record before them
did not demonstrate that Hartford's conduct amounted to an "unreasonable interference"
with the Yoakum's wrongful death claim (although the court went out of its way to
condemn the conduct), the court concluded there was no basis for the new cause of
action.
The State of Ohio does have a cause of action that is denominated "interference
with a legal remedy," but it is premised on spoliation of evidence. To state a claim for
interference with a legal remedy in Ohio, a plaintiff must show: 1) pending or probable
litigation involving the plaintiff, 2) knowledge on the part of the defendant that litigation
exists or is probable, 3) willful destruction of evidence by defendant designed to disrupt
the plaintiffs case, 4) disruption of the plaintiffs case, and 5) damages proximately
caused by the defendant's acts. Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 615 N.E.2d 1037
(1993). In this case, the Hills cannot meet these elements because not only have they
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been able to timely pursue their initial civil action, but also the defendant in Hills I,
Skyline Electric, has stipulated to liability, leaving the Hills to prove their damages
(which were fixed at the moment of Mark Hills' death).
Under the facts of this case, i.e., a situation where Liberty Mutual, a workers'
compensation insurer, responds to a request from its insured to come to an accident site,
this Court should be reluctant to recognize a claim that would have the effect of chilling
and interfering with the insurer-insured relationship. Taking into consideration the
allegations in the Hills II Complaint, the Hills have not identified post-litigation conduct
by Liberty Mutual that would justify such an invasion of the insurer-insured relationship.
The Hills cannot cobble together a claim for either intentional hindrance or tortious
interference with legal process that is cognizable under Utah law.
As the trial court noted in discussing the Hills' new theories of delay: "the Court
is not persuaded that Defendants did anything more than defend their respective interests
and participate in the legal process." (R. at 1229 n.2.) The trial court went on to note:
"If Defendants had hindered or delayed for an improper purpose, this Court would expect
to see motions to compel and motions for sanctions in Hills /." (Id.) In other words, both
the Complaint and the record as a whole are devoid of any properly preserved factual
allegations that Liberty Mutual prevented or obstructed the Hills from timely filing or
timely proving liability in Hills I. See, e.g., Bennett v. Town ofRiverhead, 940 F. Supp.
481, 492 (E.D. N.Y. 1996) (holding no factual allegations supported claim that
defendant's acts interfered with plaintiffs right to seek all judicial remedies available).
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While Utah does recognize a cause of action for abuse of process, Utah does not
recognize a cause of action for interference with a cause of action. Strong policy reasons
exist for not expanding the scope of the recognized intentional interference torts in Utah
to include a claim for interference with a cause of action. In refusing to recognize a cause
of action for perjury or third party spoliation of evidence, a district court in Kansas
discussed that other remedies exist for the wrongful conduct that forms the basis of these
kinds of intentional torts. See OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Howell, 864 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (D.
Kan. 1994). Specifically, criminal statutes exist to prevent certain conduct, and when
criminal statutes do not cover the conduct, civil remedies are available to redress the
wrongful conduct. See id. In many instances, plaintiffs are attempting to initiate
duplicative litigation when the trial court in the underlying action is in the best position to
address and correct the alleged wrongful conduct.
If defendants had caused needless delay or otherwise improperly hindered
discovery in Hills /, the trial court correctly noted that the Hills I court would have been
in the best position to enter sanctions against defendants. This would be the proper
remedy, not collateral litigation. Similarly, if the Hills' claim for intentional interference
with a cause of action were recognized, trial courts would be faced with the difficult task
of reviewing a prior action and trying to determine whether the conduct was egregious or
simply a party exercising its right to defend itself. Other jurisdictions' treatment of
interference with a cause of action are similar to this Court's resolution of abuse of
process claims in Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, ^}53, 70
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P.3d 17. In Bennett, this Court stated that the
fact that certain consequences flowed from the [underlying]
litigation or that the [underlying] litigation had some
collateral negative effect on [plaintiff] such as expenditure of
time and resources in defending the [underlying] or emotional
strain or reputational damage as a result of the [underlying]
litigation is not sufficient to state a cause of action for abuse
of process.
Id.
V.

THE HILLS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER WHICH PUNITIVE
DAMAGES COULD BE AWARDED.
The trial court correctly dismissed the Hills' claims for punitive damages. Under

Utah law, punitive damages are available only if the plaintiff can uprove the defendant's
conduct was willful and malicious, or manifested a knowing and reckless indifference and
disregard toward the rights of others." See Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah
1988). Because the Hills failed to state a claim for any intentional tort that would warrant
an award of intentional damages, the trial court properly dismissed those claims.
The trial court correctly recognized this when it stated that although |it
''understands that there are more parties and deeper pockets with three Defendants in the
case at bar, rather than just one in Hills /, Plaintiffs' desire for punitive damages is an
inadequate basis to allow punitive damages to stand alone. There must be a viable cause
of action attached to Plaintiffs' punitive damages claim." (R. 1235.) (Order at 12.)

38

CONCLUSION
The Hills failed to state any claim under which relief could be granted, and the trial
court properly dismissed the Hills II Complaint. This Court should affirm the trial court's
dismissal with prejudice of the Hills II lawsuit.

DATED this;3^a
<££ day of April, 2009.

Gary L. Johnson
Zachary E. Peterson
Tawni J. Anderson
Attorneys for Liberty Mutual
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this 2 2 _ _ day of April, 2009, to the following:
Dennis R. James, Esq.
Brian H. Hess, Esq.
Morgan, Minnock, Rice, & James, LC
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

EDWARD P. MORIARTY
BRADLEY L. BOOKE
MORIARTY, BADARUDDIN & BOOKE, LLC
8 East Broadway, Suite 312
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DANIEL J. DAVIS (admittedpro hac vice)
JASON SCHWARTZ {admittedpro hac vice)
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
1801 California Street, Suite 4200
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^
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Edward P. Moriarity (5622)
Jeffrey D. Gooch (7863)
Bradley L. Booke (9984)
MORIARITY, GOOCH, BADARUDDIN & BOOKE, LLC
9 Exchange Place, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone:
(801)521-0811
Facsimile:
(801)521-0546
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
^ *
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT,
STATE OF UTAH

'
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BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS
Individually, and as natural parents and heirs of
MARK D. HILLS (deceased);
Plaintiffs,
vs.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., an Ohio
Corporation; UPSCO UNITED PARCEL
SERVICE CO., a Delaware Corporation;
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., a Utah
Corporation; UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, UPS,
LIBERTY MUTUAL HOLDING
COMPANY, INC., a Massachusetts Mutual
Holding Company; LIBERTY MUTUAL
FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Massachusetts
Mutual Holding Company; and
SKYLINE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,

COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY
TRIAL

Judge:

^

VW-Se^

Case No.

OSd^O

^ & Z

Defendants
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COME NOW the Plaintiffs by and through their counsel, Moriarity, Gooch,
Badaruddin & Booke, LLC, and hereby allege against the Defendants as follows:
FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
Parties:
1.

At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs are and have been residents of the
State of Utah.

2.

Bruce Hills is the father of Mark D. Hills, now deceased. At all times
relevant to this action, Bruce Hills was a resident of the State of Utah.

3.

Judith Hills is the mother of Mark D. Hills, now deceased. At all times
relevant to this action, Judith Hills was a resident of the State of Utah.

4.

At all times relevant hereto, and upon information and belief, Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc., was an Ohio
Corporation located at 100 East Campus View Boulevard, Suite 300
Columbus, Ohio 43235 and was duly chartered pursuant to the laws of the
State of Utah, and was licensed to do business in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah.

5.

At all times relevant hereto, and upon information and belief, Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant UPSCO United Parcel Service Co., was a Delaware
Corporation located at 55 Glenlake Parkway NE, Atlanta, Georgia 30328,

2.
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and was duly chartered pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah, and was
licensed to do business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
At all times relevant hereto, and upon information and belief, Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc., was a Utah Corporation
located at 2040 Parkway Boulevard, West Valley City, Utah, and was duly
chartered pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah, and was licensed to do
business in Salt lake County, State of Utah. United Parcel Service, which
is located at 2040 Parkway Boulevard, West Valley City, Utah, was the
location, site, and origination point for many of the facts giving rise to this
suit. This business entity does business as United Parcel Service and UPS.
As such, plaintiffs have filed this action using the names of those business
entities as they are used by the business itself as it holds itself out to the
public. All of the above-named Defendants will hereinafter be referred to
as UPS.
At all times relevant hereto, and upon information and belief, Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant Liberty Mutual Holding Company, Inc., a
Massachusetts Mutual Holding Company, owns several stock insurance
companies including but not limited to Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company; and a Company
known as Liberty Mutual Managed Care, Inc., and although none of these
above Companies are licensed to do business in Utah, except Liberty
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Mutual Managed Care, Inc., all share the same corporate headquarters at
175 Berkely Street; Boston, Massachusetts 02117.
8.

At all times relevant hereto, and upon information and belief, Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, a
Massachusetts Mutual Holding Company was not licensed to do business
in Utah but had minimum contacts in Utah and in fact did business in Utah
and holds itself out to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of Utah
and is duly chartered pursuant to the laws of the State of Massachusetts
and has corporate headquarters at 175 Berkely Street; Boston,
Massachusetts 02117. The above named Insurance Defendants, Liberty
Mutual Holding Company, Inc., and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance
Company will hereinafter be referred to as "Liberty Mutual."

9.

At all times relevant hereto, and upon information and belief, Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant Skyline Electric Company, located at 1875 West
2300 South, West Valley City, Utah, was a Utah corporation duly
chartered pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah, and was licensed to do
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

10.

At all times relevant hereto, all acts and omissions set forth herein against
Defendants giving rise to this action were by employees and or agents of
said Defendants and said employees and or agents were acting within the
scope and course of their employment and or agency with the Defendants.

4.
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Jurisdiction and Venue:
11.

The amount in controversy in this matter exceeds that amount required for
filing in the district courts in the State of Utah.

12.

Jurisdiction in this matter is proper pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §783-4(1996).

13.

The claims arose in this judicial district and all acts and omissions
complained of occurred within this judicial district of the State of Utah.
Consequently, this Court has proper venue.

Factual Basis for Claims:
14.

On Tuesday, August 19, 2003, at approximately 4:20 A.M. an incident
occurred at the United Parcel Service (UPS) facility, located at 2040
Parkway Boulevard, West Valley City, Utah, wherein Mark D. Hills was
electrocuted.

15.

Mark D. Hills, an employee of United Parcel Service, was
electrocuted while working in and around a Mobile Distribution Unit
(MDU) located at Door 141 at said UPS facility.

16.

A MDU is backed into the UPS building and has a conveyor belt running
down the middle of it.

17.

The MDU has several doors on each side of it.

5.
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The UPS trucks back into these doors and the packages are fed into the
trucks.
The conveyor belt was located in the distribution-type trailer (MDU) that
was located at Dock Door #141 of the United Parcel Service facility.
The. MDU was being fed packages from the UPS facility conveyor
system.
A package fell beneath the conveyor chute and into a hole in the MDU.
Mark D. Hills was attempting to retrieve a package that had fallen from a
conveyor chute.
Mark D. Hills laid down on the dock platform to pull the package from a
lower level inside the distribution trailer.
As Mark D. Hills contacted the metal frame of the distribution trailer and
the building dock surface simultaneously, he became a grounding path
since the building and trailer were "hot" and not properly grounded.
Mark D. Hills was electrocuted.
Mark D. Hills was transported by ambulance to Pioneer Valley
Hospital where resuscitation efforts were preformed and he was
pronounced dead.
Prior to the electrocution of Mark D. Hills, Skyline Electric Company had
performed many installation and maintenance projects for UPS including,
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but not limited to, electrical work on light fixture, the docking structure,
and the MDU units.
28.

On or about August 15, 2003, Skyline Electric Company reinstalled a light
fixture in the MDU in which Mark D. Hills was electrocuted.

29.

Skyline Electric Company improperly installed, repaired and maintained
the light fixture by failing to properly ground the equipment.

30.

Skyline Electric Company improperly installed the grounding wire.

31.

Skyline Electric Company utilized the wrong materials in its attempt to
ground the fixtures, the MDU, and the UPS facility.

32.

After the electrocution of Mark D. Hills calls were made to the UPS
Supervisors and they determined that action, contrary to law, be taken to
examine the situation and determine what had occurred prior to calling in
Utah OSHA and law enforcement personal.

33.

The Defendant UPS knew or should have known that they were required
to secure the scene and to contact Utah OSHA prior to the changing of the
scene or the removal and/or alteration of the scene, equipment, materials
or other evidence.

34.

The Defendant prior to contacting Utah OSHA called to the scene the
Defendant Liberty Mutual and the Defendant Skyline Electric Company
and all of the Defendants acting in concert changed the scene and changed
and/or removed and/or altered equipment, materials and other evidence.

7.
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35.

The defendants willfully and intentionally and negligently removed and/or
altered equipment, materials or other evidence pertaining to the cause of
the electrocution of Mark D. Hills.

36.

Equipment, materials and other evidence pertaining to the cause of the
electrocution were removed and/or altered prior to the Defendants,
and specifically UPS management personnel, reporting the incident to
Utah OSHA and the Labor Commission or one of its Compliance
Officers.

37.

The Defendants deliberately and knowingly failed to disclose to Utah
OSHA and the Labor Commission or its Compliance Officers their
actions dealing with the equipment, materials or other evidence
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills.

38.

The Defendants deliberately and knowingly misrepresented their
actions to Utah OSHA and the Labor Commission or its Compliance
Officers dealing with the equipment, materials or other evidence
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills.

39.

The Defendants deliberately and knowingly concealed their actions to
Utah OSHA and the Labor Commission or its Compliance Officers
dealing with the equipment, materials or other evidence pertaining to
the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills.
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8.

40.

The Defendants deliberately and knowingly removed and/or altered
equipment, materials or other evidence without authorization by Utah
OSHA or the Labor Commission or one of its Compliance Officers
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills.

41.

The Defendants were in violation of law by their acts and omissions
dealing with the concealment, misrepresentation, and failure to
disclose how they dealt with the equipment, materials or other
evidence pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills.

42.

The Defendant, United Parcel Service, acting in concert with
Defendants Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, and Skyline
Electric, deliberately and knowingly allowed their own employees,
and representatives of the other defendants to remove and/or alter
equipment, materials and/or other evidence pertaining to the cause of
the electrocution of Mark D. Hills without authorization by the Labor
Commission or one of its Compliance Officers.

43.

The Defendant, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, acting in
concert with the Defendants United Parcel Service, and Skyline
Electric, deliberately and knowingly allowed their own employees,
and representatives of the other defendants to remove and/or alter
equipment, materials and/or other evidence pertaining to the cause of
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the electrocution of Mark D. Hills without authorization by the Labor
Commission or one of its Compliance Officers.
44.

The Defendant, Skyline Electric Company, acting in concert with the
Defendants United Parcel Service, and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance
Company, deliberately and knowingly allowed their own employees,
and representatives of the other defendants to remove and/or alter
equipment, materials and/or other evidence pertaining to the cause of
the electrocution of Mark D. Hills without authorization by the Labor
Commission or one of its Compliance Officers.

45.

The defendant, United Parcel Service, acting in concert with
Defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, deliberately and
knowingly allowed Heath Engineering, a third party electrical
engineering consultant, to remove and/or alter equipment, materials
and/or other evidence pertaining to the cause of an electrocution
without authorization by the Labor Commission or one of its
Compliance Officers.

46.

The defendant, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, acting in
concert with Defendant United Parcel Service, deliberately and
knowingly allowed Heath Engineering, a third party electrical
engineering consultant, to remove and/or alter equipment, materials
and/or other evidence pertaining to the cause of an electrocution
10.
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without authorization by the Labor Commission or one of its
Compliance Officers.
47.

On Tuesday, August 19, 2003, UPS management personnel was
instructed by a Utah OSHA Compliance Officer to hold the MDU and
associated equipment, in that it was to be sealed and isolated from any
contact or activity until further authorization by the Compliance
Officer.

48.

Defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company acting with the
advice and consent of Defendant UPS authorized the contact and
hiring of Heath Engineering to investigate the scene even though they
were aware or should have been aware of the order and instruction of
the Utah OSHA Compliance Supervisor to UPS management
personnel to seal the scene and no to tamper with the equipment,
materials and other evidence until it had been officially released by
Utah OSHA.

49.

On the morning of Wednesday, August 20, 2003, Defendant UPS
management personnel, acting in concert with Defendant Liberty
Mutual Fire Insurance Company

allowed

and

directed

Heath

Engineering to conduct an investigation of the MDU without such
authorization by the Compliance Officer.

11.
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50.

The investigation resulted in the removal and/or alteration of
equipment; materials and/or other evidence pertaining to the cause of
the electrocution of Mark D. Hills.

51.

The acts and omissions of the Defendants set forth herein were
willful, intentional, negligent acts and omissions that resulted in the
changing of the scene, and materials and equipment and other
evidence being negligently removed and/or altered.

52.

The defendants had knowledge of said acts and omissions and willfully
and intentionally misled the lawful investigators of these facts and failed
to disclose said facts to the lawful investigators even when asked.

53.

The acts and omissions of the Defendants set forth herein were
engaged in for the purpose of covering up the true facts and
circumstances that led to the wrongful death of Mark D. Hills.

54.

The acts and omissions of the Defendants set forth herein were
engaged in to prevent the Plaintiffs from bringing an action against
the defendants including any third party actions and any actions for
spoilage of evidence and the above acts and omissions were engaged
in for the purpose of hindering said litigation.

55.

As a direct and proximate cause and result of said acts and omissions,
Mark D. Hills died and the Plaintiffs suffered damages as set forth more
fully in the section of this Complaint entitled "Damages."
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First Claim For Relief: Negligence
56.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all statements and allegations
contained in paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.

57.

At all relevant times, Defendant United Parcel Service had exclusive
custody and control of the premises at which the incident occurred, and
the material evidence attendant thereto.

58.

At all relevant times, it was foreseeable that legal action, including but not
limited to the prosecution of Plaintiffs' legal claims, would arise out of the
circumstances surrounding the death of Mark Hills.

59.

All Defendants, including Defendant United Parcel Service, were under a
directive and obligation from Utah OSHA, the Utah Labor Commissioner,
and applicable law to preserve the premises and material evidence and to
protect it against harm, destruction, or other spoliation.

60.

Pursuant to the directives from Utah OSHA, The Utah Labor Commission,
and applicable law, and all attendant circumstances as set forth above, the
Defendants committed themselves to the performance of an undertaking,
to wit, the preservation of the premises and material evidence attendant to
the death of Mark Hills and to protect it against harm, destruction, or other
spoliation.

13.
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61.

In so committing themselves to the performance of such an undertaking
the Defendants assumed a duty of reasonable care for the protection of
Plaintiffs, including, but not limited to, the protection of evidence
necessary for the prosecution of any of Plaintiffs, legal claims for relief
arising out of the death of Mark Hills.

62.

The Defendants, acting by and through their agents and employees, owed
duties of care to the Plaintiffs' decedent, Mark D. Hills, and to the
Plaintiffs to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills.

63.

The Defendants owed a duty to Mark D. Hills and others who would be in
his stead to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills.

64.

The Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs and to Mark D. Hills and others
to provide adequate training and supervision to its employees and agents
to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence pertaining to
the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills.

65.

The Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs and to Mark D. Hills and others
to make and implement and enforce policies and procedures to ensure that
the scene, equipment, materials or evidence pertaining to the cause of
the electrocution of Mark D. Hills was not disturbed.

14.
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66.

By its acts and omissions as described herein the Defendants by and
through the acts and omissions of its employees and or agents, breached
the duties described above, thereby directly and proximately causing the
cover-up and spoliation of evidence and tortiously interfered with the
Plaintiffs right to bring Causes of Action resulting from the wrongful
death of Mark D. Hills.

67.

The acts and omissions of the Defendants set forth herein were
engaged in to prevent the Plaintiffs from bringing an action against
the defendants including any third party actions and any actions for
spoilage of evidence and the above acts and omissions were engaged
in for the purpose of hindering said litigation.

68.

As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's acts and omissions, the
Plaintiffs have suffered damages, as more specifically set forth below in
the section of this Complaint entitled "Damages."
Second Claim For Relief: Intentional Misconduct

69.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all statements and allegations
contained in paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.

70.

At all relevant times, Defendant United Parcel Service had exclusive
custody and control of the premises at which the incident occurred, and
the material evidence attendant thereto.

15.
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At all relevant times, it was foreseeable that legal action, including but not
limited to the prosecution of Plaintiffs, legal claims, would arise out of the
circumstances surrounding the death of Mark Hills.
All Defendants, including Defendant United Parcel Service, were under a
directive and obligation from Utah OSHA, the Utah Labor Commissioner,
and applicable law to preserve the premises and material evidence and to
protect it against harm, destruction, or other spoliation.
Pursuant to the directives from Utah OSHA, The Utah labor Commission,
and applicable law, and all attendant circumstances as set forth above, the
Defendants committed themselves to the performance of an undertaking,
to wit, the preservation of the premises and material evidence attendant to
the death of Mark Hills and to protect it against harm, destruction, or other
spoliation.
In so committing themselves to the performance of such an undertaking
the Defendants assumed a duty of reasonable care for the protection of
Plaintiffs, including, but not limited to, the protection of evidence
necessary for the prosecution of any of Plaintiffs, legal claims for relief
arising out of the death of Mark Hills.
The Defendants, acting by and through their agents and employees, owed
duties of care to the Plaintiffs' decedent, Mark D. Hills, and to the
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Plaintiffs to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills.
76.

The Defendants owed a duty to Mark D. Hills and others who would be in
his stead to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills.

77.

The Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs and to Mark D. Hills and others
to provide adequate training and supervision to its employees and agents
to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence pertaining to
the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills.

78.

The Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs and to Mark D. Hills and others
to make and implement and enforce policies and procedures to ensure that
the scene, equipment, materials or evidence pertaining to the cause of
the electrocution of Mark D. Hills was not disturbed.

79.

By its acts and omissions as described herein the Defendants by and
through the acts and omissions of its employees and or agents,
intentionally, willfully and deliberately breached the duties described
above, thereby directly and proximately causing the cover-up and
spoliation of evidence and tortious ly interfered with the Plaintiffs right to
bring Causes of Action resulting from the wrongful death of Mark D.
Hills.

17.

000017

The acts and omissions of the Defendants set forth herein were
intentionally, willfully and deliberately engaged in to prevent the
Plaintiffs from bringing an action against the defendants including
any third party actions and any actions for spoilage of evidence and
the above acts and omissions were engaged in for the purpose of
hindering said litigation.
As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's acts and omissions, the
Plaintiffs have suffered damages, as more specifically set forth below in
the section of this Complaint entitled "Damages."
Second Claim For Relief: Tortious Interference
Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all statements and allegations
contained in paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.
At all relevant times, Defendant United Parcel Service had exclusive
custody and control of the premises at which the incident occurred, and
the material evidence attendant thereto.
At all relevant times, it was foreseeable that legal action, including but not
limited to the prosecution of Plaintiffs, legal claims, would arise out of the
circumstances surrounding the death of Mark Hills.
All Defendants, including Defendant United Parcel Service, were under a
directive and obligation from Utah OS HA, the Utah Labor Commissioner,
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and applicable law to preserve the premises and material evidence and to
protect it against harm, destruction, or other spoliation.
86.

Pursuant to the directives from Utah OSHA, The Utah labor Commission,
and applicable law, and all attendant circumstances as set forth above, the
Defendants committed themselves to the performance of an undertaking,
to wit, the preservation of the premises and material evidence attendant to
the death of Mark Hills and to protect it against harm, destruction, or other
spoliation.

87.

In so committing themselves to the performance of such an undertaking
the Defendants assumed a duty of reasonable care for the protection of
Plaintiffs, including, but not limited to, the protection of evidence
necessary for the prosecution of any of Plaintiffs, legal claims for relief
arising out of the death of Mark Hills.

88.

The Defendants, acting by and through their agents and employees, owed
duties of care to the Plaintiffs' decedent, Mark D. Hills, and to the
Plaintiffs to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills.

89.

The Defendants owed a duty to Mark D. Hills and others who would be in
his stead to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence
pertaining to the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills.
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90.

The Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs and to Mark D. Hills and others
to provide adequate training and supervision to its employees and agents
to not disturb the scene, equipment, materials or evidence pertaining to
the cause of the electrocution of Mark D. Hills.

91.

The Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs and to Mark D. Hills and others
to make and implement and enforce policies and procedures to ensure that
the scene, equipment, materials or evidence pertaining to the cause of
the electrocution of Mark D. Hills was not disturbed.

92.

By its acts and omissions as described herein the Defendants by and
through the acts and omissions of its employees and or agents, negligently,
intentionally, willfully and deliberately breached the duties described
above, thereby directly and proximately causing the cover-up and
spoliation of evidence and tortious interference with the Plaintiffs right to
bring Causes of Action resulting from the wrongful death of Mark D.
Hills.

93.

The acts and omissions of the Defendants set forth herein were
negligently, intentionally, willfully and deliberately engaged in to
prevent the Plaintiffs from bringing an action against the defendants
including any third party actions and any actions for spoilage of
evidence and the above acts and omissions were engaged in for the
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purpose of hindering said litigation and for the purpose of tortiously
interfering with said causes of action.
94.

As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's acts and omissions, the
Plaintiffs have suffered damages, as more specifically set forth below in
the section of this Complaint entitled "Damages."

DAMAGES
95.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all statements and allegations
contained in all prior paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

96.

As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendants,
Plaintiffs were injured and Plaintiffs have incurred the following damages:
a) The loss of care, comfort, and society of Mark D. Hills;
b) Burial expenses and funeral expenses for Mark D. Hills;
c) Past and future emotional pain and suffering;
d) Past medical expenses;*
e) Past and future loss of enjoyment of life;
f) Loss of earnings and earning capacity;
g) Past special damages;
h) Punitive Damages;
i) Past and future general damages;

21.
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j) Damages resulting from tortuous interference with a legal cause of
action; and
k) Damages resulting from hindrance with a lawful cause of action.
1) Any damages provided by law, equity, or court ruling in accordance
with the laws of the State of Utah.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment, order and decree of this Court as follows:
a)

That judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant.

b)

That Plaintiffs be awarded all damages that are fair and just, in an amount
supported by the allegations in this Compliant and the evidence adduced at trial,
including pre and post judgment interest.

c)

That Plaintiffs be awarded their costs of suit incurred herein.

d)

That Plaintiffs be awarded all other and further relief as the Court deems
proper.

22.
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DATED this 16th day of August, 2005.

MORIARITY, GOOCH, BADARUDDIN &
BOOKE, LLC

Edvtatd^

Jeffrey
Bradley L. Booke
9 Exchange Place, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-0811
Facsimile: (801)521-0546
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
Plaintiffs demand that a jury hear and decide the above issues and allegations.
DATED this 16th day of August, 2005.
MORIARITY, GOOCH, BADARUDDIN &
BOOKE, LLC

Edward P. M»riarity
D. Good;
Bradley L. Booke
9 Exchange Place, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-0811
Facsimile: (801) 521-0546
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Edward P. Moriarity (5622)
Jeffrey D. Gooch (7863)
Bradley L. Booke (9984)
MORIARITY, GOOCH, BADARUDDIN & BOOKE, LLC
9 Exchange Place, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)521-0811
Facsimile:
(801)521-0546
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DIVISION, STATE OF
UTAH
—oooOooo—

BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS
Individually, and as natural parents and heirs of
MARK D. HILLS (deceased);
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SKYLINE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation

COMPLAINT AM)
DEMAND FOR JURY
TRIAL

0 Yo/or^sJudge:
Case No. <_

Defendant.

COME NOW the Plaintiffs by and through their counsel, Moriarity, Gooch,
Badaruddin & Booke, LLC, and hereby allege against the Defendant as follows:
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FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
A.

Parties and Non-Parties:
1.

At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs are and have been residents of the
State of Utah.

2.

Bruce Hills is the father of Mark D. Hills, now deceased. At all times
relevant to this action, Bruce Hills was a resident of the State of Utah.

3.

Judith Hills is the mother of Mark D. Hills, now deceased. At all times
relevant to this action, Judith Hills was a resident of the State of Utah.

4.

At all times relevant hereto, and upon information and belief, Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant Skyline Electric Company, 1875 West 2300 South,
West Valley City, Utah, was a Utah corporation duly chartered pursuant to
the laws of the State of Utah, and was licensed to do business in Salt lake
County, State of Utah.

5.

At all times relevant hereto, all acts and omissions set forth herein against
Defendant Skyline Electric Company giving rise to this action were by
employees and or agents of said Defendant and said employees and or
agents were acting within the scope and course of their employment and or
agency with the Defendant Skyline Electric Company.

B.

Jurisdiction and Venue:
6.

The amount in controversy in this matter exceeds that amount required for
filing in the district courts in the State of Utah.

2.
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7.

Jurisdiction in this matter is proper pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §783-4(1996).

8.

The claims arose in this judicial district and all acts and omissions
complained of occurred within this judicial district of the State of Utah.
Consequently, this Court has proper venue.

C.

Factual Basis for Claims:
9.

On Tuesday, August 19, 2003, at approximately 4:20 A.M. an incident
occurred at the United Parcel Service (UPS) facility, located at 2040
Parkway Boulevard, wherein Mark D. Hills was electrocuted.

10.

Mark

D. Hills, an employee of United Parcel

Service, was

electrocuted while working in and around a Mobile Distribution Unit
(MDU) located at Door 141 at said UPS facility.
11.

A MDU is backed into the UPS building and has a conveyor belt running
down the middle of it.

12.

The MDU has several doors on each side of it

13.

The UPS trucks back into these doors and the packages are fed into the
trucks.

14.

The conveyor belt was located in the distribution-type trailer (MDU) that
was located at Dock Door #141 of the United Parcel Service facility.

15.

The MDU was being fed packages from the UPS facility conveyor
system.

16.

A package fell beneath the conveyor chute and into a hole in the MDU.

17.

Mark D. Hills was attempting to retrieve a package that had fallen from a
conveyor chute.

18.

Mark D. Hills laid down on the dock platform to pull the package from a
lower level inside the distribution trailer.

3.
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19.

As Mark D. Hills contacted the metal frame of the distribution trailer and
the building dock surface simultaneously, he became a grounding path
since the building and trailer were "hot" and not properly grounded.

20.

Mark D. Hills was electrocuted.

21.

Other employees in the area called Rescue sendees which were called
to the facility.

22.

Mr. Hills was transported by ambulance to Pioneer Valley Hospital
where resuscitation efforts were preformed and he was pronounced dead.

23.

Prior to the electrocution of Mark D. Hills, Skyline Electric Company had
performed many installation and maintenance projects for UPS including,
but not limited to, electrical work on the docking structure and the MDU
units.

24.

On or about August 15, 2003, Skyline Electric Company reinstalled a light
fixture in the MDU.

25.

Skyline Electric Company improperly installed, repaired and maintained
the light fixture by failing to properly ground the equipment.

26.

Skyline Electric Company improperly installed the grounding wire.

27.

Skyline Electric Company utilized the wrong materials in its attempt to
ground the fixtures, the MDU, and the UPS facility.

28.

The employee of Skyline Electric Company, who worked on the light
fixture, was Justin Bright

29.

All acts and omissions of the Defendant Skyline Electric Company were
by and tlirough its employees and/or agents acting within the scope of
their employment or agency.

30.

As a result of the negligent acts and omissions of the Defendant Skyline
Electric Company and its employees and/or agents for which Defendant
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Skyline Electric Company is vicariously liable, Mark D. Hills was
electrocuted.
31.

As a direct and proximate cause and result of said acts and omissions,
Mark D. Hills died and the Plaintiffs suffered damages as set forth more
fully in the section of this Complaint entitled "Damages."

First Claim For Relief: Negligence
32.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all statements and allegations
contained in paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.

33.

Defendant Skyline Electric Company, acting by and through its agents and
employees, owed duties of care to the Plaintiffs5 decedent, Mark D. Hills,
and to the Plaintiffs to perform its work in a reasonable, safe and proper
manner, utilize the proper materials, and to render its services with
reasonable care, especially when dealing with electricity.

34.

Defendant Skyline Electric Company owed a duty to Mark D. Hills and
others who would be around the buildings and vehicles upon which they
performed

electrical

services

including

repair,

maintenance,

and

installation.
35.

Defendant Skyline Electric Company owed a duty to Mark D. Hills and
others to provide adequate training and supervision to its employees and
agents for all normal and expected duties in the electrical service area.

5.
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36.

Defendant Skyline Electric Company owed a duty to Mark D. Hills and
others to provide adequate tools and materials so its employees and agents
could safely provide proper services.

37.

Defendant Skyline Electric Company owed a duty to Mark D. Hills and
others to implement and enforce policies and procedures to ensure the safe
operation of its electrical service.

38.

By its acts and omissions as described above, Defendant Skyline
Electrical Company, by and through the acts and omissions of its
employees and or agents, breached the duties described above, thereby
directly and proximately causing the wrongful death of Mark D. Hills.

39.

As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's acts and omissions,
Mark D. Hills was electrocuted and the Plaintiffs have suffered damages,
as more specifically set forth below in the section of this Complaint
entitled "Damages."

DAMAGES
40.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all statements and allegations
contained in all prior paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

41.

As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendant,
Plaintiffs were injured and Plaintiffs have incurred the following damages:
a) The loss of care, comfort, and society of Mark D. Hills;
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b) Burial expenses and funeral expenses for Mark D. Hills;
c) Past and future emotional pain and suffering;
d) Past medical expenses;
e) Past and future loss of enjoyment of life;
f) Loss of earnings and earning capacity;
g) Past special damages; and
h) Past and future general damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that judgment, order and decree of this Court be as
follows:
a)

That judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant

b)

That Plaintiffs be awarded all damages that are fair and just, in an amount
supported by the allegations in this Compliant and the evidence adduced at trial,
including pre and post judgment interest,

c)

That Plaintiffs be awarded their costs of suit incurred herein.

d)

That Plaintiffs be awarded all other and further relief as the Court deems
proper.

DATED this _ i _ l day of October, 2004.

7.
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MORIARITY, GOOCH, BADARUDDIN &
BOOKE, LLC

Mbriarity (5622)
reySTGSgch (7863)
Bradley L. Booke (9984)
9 Exchange Place, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-0811
Facsimile: (801) 521-0546
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

8.
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DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
Plaintiffs demand that a jury hear and decide the above issues and allegations.
DATED this / V day of October, 2004.
MORIARITY, GOOCH, BADARUDDIN &
BOOKE, LLC
(

Jv^rd^Moriarity (5622)
J e t f r e y r r t W h (7863)
Bradley L. Booke (9984)
9 Exchange Place, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-0811
Facsimile: (801) 521-0546
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

9.
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KiraM. Slawson(7081)
BLACKBURN & STOLL, PC
257 East 200 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-7900
Facsimile: (801) 521-7965
Taggart Hansen (admitted pro hac vice)
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
1801 California Street, Suite 4200
Denver, Colorado 80202
Telephone: (303) 298-5700
Facsimile: (303)313-2857
Attorneys for United Parcel Service Inc.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DIVISION STATE OF UTAH
BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS
Individually, and as natural parents and heirs of
MARK D. HILLS (deceased);
Plaintiffs,
vs.

[111Will QEimj ORDER
RE:
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION
TO DISMISS BASED ON MOOTNESS
Civil No. 1:050407708
Judge Terry Christiansen

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., an Ohio
corporation; UPSCO UNITED PARCEL
SERVICE CO., a Delaware corporation
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., a Utah
corporation; LIBERTY MUTUAL HOLDING
COMPANY, INC., a Massachusetts Mutual
Holding Company; LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Massachusetts
Mutual Holding Company; and SKYLINE
ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Defendants.
BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS
Individually, and as natural parents and heirs of
MARK D. HILLS (deceased^:

Civil No. 1:040107128
Judge Stephen Roth

Plaintiffs,
VS.

SKYLINE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant.
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Defendant United Parcel Service Inc. ("UPS") filed a renewed motion to dismiss the
claims asserted by plaintiffs Bruce Hills and Judith Hills ("Plaintiffs") in the case of Hills v.
United Parcel Service Inc, et al, Civil No. 1:050407708 (Christiansen, J.) ^ Hills //").
Defendants Liberty Mutual and Skyline Electric Co. filed motions joining in UPS's renewed
motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs filed an opposition, and UPS filed a reply brief. UPS's renewed
motion to dismiss was submitted for decision, and a hearing was held on March 31, 2008, at
which counsel for UPS, Liberty Mutual, and Plaintiffs appeared and presented oral argument.
Having considered UPS's renewed motion to dismiss, the opposition thereto, oral argument, and
the record in this case, it is hereby:
ORDERED that Skyline's Cross-Claims asserted against UPS in Hills II be, and hereby
are, DISMISSED with prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief—Negligence asserted in Hills II be, and
hereby is, DISMISSED with prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief—Intentional Misconduct asserted in
Hills //be, and hereby is, DISMISSED with prejudice to the extent such a claim seeks damages
identified in Paragraphs 96(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) of Plaintiffs' Hills //Complaint
.and Demand for Jury Trial ("Hills //Complaint"). Plaintiffs can continue to seek from Skyline
Electric Co. through the Hills I litigation the damages identified in Paragraphs 96 (a), (b), (c),
(d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) of Plaintiffs' Hills //Complaint. Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief is not
dismissed to the extent it seeks damages identified in Paragraphs 96(h), (j), (k), and (1). Pending
supplemental briefing, the Court reserves its decision on whether the remaining aspects of
Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief should be dismissed. It is further
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ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief—Tortious Interference asserted in
Hills //be, and hereby is DISMISSED with prejudice to the extent such a claim seeks damages
identified in Paragraphs 96 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) of Plaintiffs' Hills //Complaint.
Plaintiffs can continue to seek from Skyline Electric Co. through the Hills I litigation the
damages identified in Paragraphs 96 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) of Plaintiffs' Hills II
Complaint. Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief in Hills II is not dismissed to the extent it seeks
damages identified in Paragraphs 96 (h), (j), (k), and (1). Pending supplemental briefing, the
Court reserves its decision on whether the remaining aspects of Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief
should be dismissed. It is further
ORDERED that UPS, Liberty Mutual, and Plaintiffs shall submit supplemental briefing
on whether, given Plaintiffs' Hills //Complaint and Skyline Electric Co.'s admission of liability
in Hills v Skyline Electric Co , Civil No. 1:040107128 (Roth, J.), Plaintiffs Second and Third
Claims for Relief remain viable such that Plaintiffs would be entitled to recover through the
Hills //case the damages asserted in Paragraphs 96(h), (j), (k), and (1). UPS's and Liberty
Mutual's respective supplemental opening briefs shall be due on or before May 1, 2008, limited
to 10 pages. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(2). Plaintiffs' supplemental responsive brief shall be due
on or before June 1, 2008, limited to 10 pages. Id UPS's and Liberty Mutual's respective
supplemental reply briefs shall be due on or before June 15, 2008, limited to 5 pages. Id,

DATED this JZ^ day of ^3OYVJI

, 2008.

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
WEST JORDAN DIVISION
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of May, 2008,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing [PROPOSED] ORDER NO, 1 RE DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION TO
DISMISS BASED ON MOOTNESS to be sent via U.S. Mail and E-mail to the following:
Stephen P. Morgan, Esq.
Dennis R. James, Esq.
Sara N. Becker, Esq.
MORGAN, MINNOCK, RICE & JAMES, L.C.
136 South Main Street
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant Skyline Electric Co.
Edward Moriarity
Jacque Ramos
MORIARITY, BADARUDDIN & BOOKE
8 East Broadway, Suite 312
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Gary Johnson
Zachary Peterson
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Wells Fargo Center
299 So. Main Street, 15th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Liberty Mutual
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS,
individually, and as natural parents and heirs
of MARK D. HILLS (deceased),
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS'
RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., an Ohio
corporation; UPSCO UNITED PARCEL
SERVICE CO., a Delaware corporation;
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., a Utah
corporation; LIBERTY MUTUAL
HOLDING COMPANY, INC., a
Massachusetts Mutual Holding Company;
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Massachusetts Mutual
Holding Company; and SKYLINE
ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

Case No. 050407708
Judge Terry L. Christiansen

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on September 3, 2008, for hearing on Defendants United
Parcel Service Inc., UPSCO United Parcel Service Co., and United Parcel Service Inc., (collectively
referred to as "UPS") Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs claims. Edward P. Mortality and
Bradley L. Booke, appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs, Jason Schwartz, Daniel Davis, Taggart Hansen
and Kira M Slawson appeared on behalf of UPS, Dennis R. James appeared on behalf of Liberty
Mutual Fire Insurance Company and Liberty Mutual Holding Company, Inc. (collectively referred
to as "Liberty Mutual") and Gary L. Johnson appeared on behalf of Skyline Electrical Company
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("Skyline"). Having considered the parties arguments, supplemental briefs, the applicable law, and
the record in this case, the Court issues the following Memorandum Decision and Order:

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are the parents of a former UPS employee, Mark D. Hills, who died in an
electrical accident while performing his work in August 2003. Plaintiffs filed Hills v. Skyline
Electric Co., civil no. 040107125 (Roth, J.) ("Hills I") in October 2004, against Skyline alleging
that its negligence caused the death of their son.
While engaged in discovery in Hills /, Plaintiffs filed this law suit, known as Hills II, in
September 2005, alleging that Defendants negligently and intentionally spoliated evidence in
connection with the electrocution of Mark D. Hills and intentionally hindered the Hills I
litigation. See Hills II Complaint dated August 16, 2005,fflf32-55 and 69-94. Plaintiffs alleged
Defendant's conduct proximately caused them damages and sought punitive damages, damages
resulting from tortuous interference with a legal cause of action, damages resulting from
hindrance with a lawful cause of action and any other damages.1 See id at f 96(h), (j), (k), and
(i).
Skyline answered Plaintiffs complaint and filed cross claims against UPS. UPS and
Liberty Mutual filed motions to dismiss both Plaintiffs complaint and Skyline's cross claims.
The Court initially stayed ruling on UPS and Liberty Mutuals' motions to dismiss
pending resolution of Hills /because (1) the discovery for Hills land Hills II had been
consolidated and would permit the parties to determine exactly what occurred that caused the

1

Other damages were also claimed, but these were dismissed pursuant to the Court's
June 12, 2008 Order.
2
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electrocution death of Mark D. Hills and what changes were made and by whom to the scene of
the accident which constitute the "spoliation of evidence"claim; (2) the issue of whether Utah
courts recognize the tort of "spoliation of evidence" has not been determined and (3) it is
necessary for Hills I to be resolved to determine whether plaintiffs are unable to prove their case
in Hills /before determining that such inability was due to "spoliated evience."
After three years of discovery, Skyline amended their answer in Hills I to admit liability,
but still dispute the damages alleged by Plaintiffs. Thereafter, UPS renewed its motion to
dismiss in this case, Hills II, and Liberty Mutual and Skyline joined in the motion. The Court
granted UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Skyline's cross claim and granted in part and reserved
in part UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint in an Order dated June 12, 2008.
Liberty Mutual and Skyline filed motions to join UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs
filed an opposition and UPS filed a reply, which was joined by Liberty Mutual and Skyline.
A hearing on the motion was held on March 31, 2008, wherein Plaintiffs, UPS, Liberty
Mutual and Skyline appeared and presented oral argument. The Court ruled on a majority of the
issues in an order dated June 12, 2008. In that Order, the Court reserved decision on Plaintiffs'
Second and Third Claims for Relief to the extent those claims sought damages identified in
Paragraphs 96(h), (j), (k), and (1). Plaintiffs' second claim for relief is intentional misconduct
and the third claim for relief is tortuous interference. Both of these claims appear to be
intentional spoliation of evidence claims and at the hearing sounded like abuse of process claims.
The damages claims related to these claims for purposes of this motion are in Paragraph 96,
subsections (h) Punitive damages; (j) Damages resulting from tortuous interference with a legal
cause of action; (k) Damages resulting from hindrance with a lawful cause of action and (1) Any
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damages provided by law, equity, or court ruling in accordance with the laws of the State of
Utah.
The Court requested supplemental briefs on whether, given Plaintiffs' Hills //Complaint
and Skyline Electric Company's admission of liability in Hills /, Plaintiffs Second and Third
Claims for Relief remain viable after Skyline's admission of liability in Hills I such that
Plaintiffs would be entitled to recover through this case the damages asserted in Paragraphs
96(h), (j)i (k), and (1). Plaintiffs, UPS, Liberty Mutual and Skyline have filed supplemental briefs
on the issue. A hearing was held on September 3, 2008.
SKYLINE ELECTRIC AND LIBERTY MUTUAL'S MOTIONS TO JOIN
IN UPS5 RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS
Before addressing UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss, the Court will first address a matter
raised by Liberty Mutual and Skyline. Apparently, there was some confusion on the application
of the June 12, 2008 Order to Skyline and Liberty Mutual. UPS' renewed motion to dismiss was
filed by the UPS defendants. The other defendants, Liberty Mutual and Skyline, filed motions to
join UPS' renewed motion to dismiss. Liberty Mutual is UPS' workman's compensation
insurance carrier. Skyline is the electric company that performed the electrical work at UPS'
work site where the death of Mr. Hills occurred. Plaintiffs did not oppose Liberty Mutual and
Skyline's motions to join. To avoid misunderstanding and to clarify application of the June 12,
2008 Order, the language of the Court's June 12, 2008 Order clearly reflect that Liberty Mutual
and Skyline were included in that Order.

061227
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LAW
A court may dismiss a case if the party fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under subdivision (b)(6) admits the facts
alleged in the complaint, but challenges Plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts. St.
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). All reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the facts should be made in a light most favorable to Plaintiff.
Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991). A complaint is required to give the opposing party
fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of
litigation involved, or it is subject to dismissal under subdivision (b)(6). Utah Steel & Iron Co. v.
Bosch, 475 P.2d 1019 (1970).
I
INTENTIONAL SPOLIATION CLAIMS
Plaintiffs claim that although specific torts entitled "intentional misconduct" or "tortuous
interference" do not exist in Utah, the substance of these claims constitute acts of intentional
interference. Intentional interference is a tort that has been acknowledged by the Utah Supreme
Court. Plaintiffs argue that although intentional interference is often associated with business
relations, intentional interference within the context of harm to prospective economic relations
creates the logical foundation for spoliation claims. Plaintiffs argue that the role and impact of
UPS, Liberty Mutual and Skyline's (collectively referred to as "Defendants") intentional
interference with evidence and the investigation pertaining to Mr. Hills' death in Hills /remains
to be seen.2 In Hills /, Skyline still denies any damages. Plaintiffs argue that if they are unable to
2

The Court notes that at the March 31, 2008 hearing, Plaintiffs made arguments based
upon facts and a new theory that were not in the Complaint and Demand for jury trial. Plaintiffs

OOi
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prove damages or damages are seriously impaired Plaintiffs5 interference with a legal remedy
claim remains viable. Plaintiffs argue that these proceedings have impacted Plaintiffs'
expectancy in Hills I and Defendants cannot claim a legal "right" to inject such deceit into a
lawsuit.
As acknowledged by Plaintiffs, '"'intentional misconduct" or "tortuous interference"
claims do not exist in Utah. Plaintiffs argue that the Utah Supreme Court has recognized these
torts as plead by Plaintiffs. The Court disagrees. While the tort of intentional interference with
economic relations has been recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Leigh Funiture and
Carpet Co. V. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982), it is a big leap to jump from economic
relations to spoliation of evidence. Nevertheless, the label is unimportant, and the substance of

argued that these facts were included in the Complaint, however, the Court disagrees. These
additional facts relate to a long chain of legal events that ensued after Mr. Hills death. Plaintiffs
argue that the issue of how Defendants' malfeasance resulted in a chain of unnecessary legal
proceedings by increasing the costs of suit or, in that matter, even necessitating a full blown law
suit is still an issue.
From reviewing the facts in the Complaint and those additional facts in the briefs and
even viewing those facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court is not persuaded that
Defendants did anything more than defend their respective interests and participate in the legal
process. Wrongful death cases, by their very nature are cases that generally do not resolve
quickly. Any claim for damages relating to a delay should be decided in the damages portion of
Hills /, not here, an independent law suit for intentional spoliation. If Defendants had hindered
or delayed for an improper purpose, this Court would expect to see motions to compel and
motions for sanctions in Hills L However, no such motions have been filed in Hills L Moreover,
Plaintiffs may have been premature in filing the present law suit because the litigation in Hills I
had not concluded and there was no way to determine whether the acts of Defendants had
affected the value of Plaintiffs claims in Hills I. This case was stayed even before deciding a
motion to dismiss in part because it was "necessary for Hills I to be resolved to determine
whether plaintiffs are unable to prove their case in Hills /before determining that such inability
was due to 'spoliated evience.'" Nevertheless, these additional facts and new theory are
improperly raised in response to a motion to dismiss a complaint that does not include them.
Therefore, the Court refrains from making a ruling on these arguments.
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the actions is what concerns this Court. Plaintiffs appear to be claiming an independent tort of
intentional spoliation of evidence.3
Spoliation can be traced back to an ancient Latin phrase: Contra Spoliatorem Omnia
Praesumuntur, which literally means all things presumed against the destroyer. The concept of
punishing those who interfere with the legal rights of another has been around in some form for
centuries. Such punishment includes: the adverse inference jury instruction that declares the
destruction of relevant evidence gives rise to an inference that the thing which has been destroyed
or mutilated would have been unfavorable to the position of the party responsible for the
spoliation; discovery sanctions that may include dismissal of a case; and statutory criminal
prosecution.
In 1984, the concept of spoliation of evidence as an independent tort was conceived.
California was the first state to adopt spoliation as an independent cause of action in a first party
case, Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). However,
California has since retreated from its earlier decision to recognize spoliation as an independent
tort, see Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal. \99S)(refusing
to acknowledge an independent tort of intentional first-party spoliation and rejecting the Smith
court's acceptance of the tort) and the Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d
223, 233 (Cal. \999){rejecting an independent tort of third party spoliation).

3

Defendants argue that the Court's dismissal of the negligent spoliation of evidence
claim should result in the dismissal of these "identical claims." The Court disagrees that the
claims are identical. There is a difference between a negligent and intentional tort. The state of
mind for each is different, therefore, the dismissal of the negligent tort does not necessarily
preclude the intentional tort.
HILLS vs. UPS, et al.
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Neither the intentional nor the negligent spoliation of pvidence as an independent tort has
been adopted in Utah.4 The single case substantively addressing an area of the spoliation of
evidence doctrine by name is Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419 (UT App.
1994). In Burns, a product liability case, the trial court granted summary judgment because
Plaintiff could not show the bicycle at issue was defective. Plaintiff claimed that he could not
provide proof because Defendant had destroyed the evidence of the defect and requested there be
an evidentiary inference against Defendant that the bike was defective. The trial court refused
Plaintiffs request. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals stated: "While Burns cites no authority
demonstrating that Utah has adopted the spoliation doctrine, we conclude that it would not apply
to the facts of this case in any event." Id. The Court concluded that the requirements for
establishing an evidentiary inference based on spoliation had not been met because Defendants
were not and could not have been on notice of Burns contemplation to sue and there was no
independent duty to retain the allegedly defective part.
The limited area of the spoliation of evidence doctrine cited by the Burns Court applied to
a negligent first party and the remedy sought was an evidentiary inference. In this case, Plaintiffs
filed an independent tort action for the intentional spoliation of the evidence against Defendants,
first party Skyline and third parties UPS and Liberty Mutual, and the remedy sought is damages.
For a doctrine that has not been adopted in Utah, this is a great leap from a negligent first party
and the remedy of an adverse inference to an independent tort for intentional spoliation of the
evidence and a remedy of damages.
4

The single Utah Supreme Court case citing the spoliation of evidence doctrine, State v.
Seventy-Three Thousand One Hundred Thirty Dollars, 2001 UT 67, does no more than name the
doctrine because the Court resolved the case on another ground for the appeal.
HILLS vs. UPS, et ah
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The spoliation of evidence doctrine has been discussed and sparingly applied in various
forms throughout the United States.5 There appears to be a national debate on whether spoliation
of the evidence should be an independent tort and if so, what acts should trigger the tort
(negligent, intentional or both), what type of evidence should it extend to (limited to physical
evidence or include all evidence), who should the tort extend to (first parties, third parties or
both), and what should the remedy be (adverse inference, sanctions, dismissal, maximum
damages, or a combination thereof).6 Surprisingly, Utah has not entered into the fray of this
national debate. Since the spoliation of evidence doctrine has not been adopted in Utah in any
form, this Court does not have a set rule or factors to apply to the parties to determine whether
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
General tort law requires a plaintiff to prove that a defendant proximately caused Plaintiff
damages. To prove a defendant proximately caused Plaintiff damages in a spoliation of evidence
claim Plaintiff must show that: "(1) plaintiff pursued the initial civil action, and was unsuccessful
because of the absence of the destroyed evidence, or at the very least, that the destruction of the
evidence in question made pursuing the initial claim impossible; and (2) that the destroyed

US LAW Network, Inc., USLAW Spoliation of Evidence Compendium (2005),
http://uslawnetwork.org/files/public/Spoliation Compendium.pdf provides a brief summary of
the spoliation law in each of the states.
6

For additional information on the national debate relating to spoliation of evidence as
an independent tort and the application of the doctrine there are various sources to refer. See
Rachel L. Sykes, Comment, A Phantom Menace: Spoliation of Evidence in Idaho Civil Cases, 42
Idaho L. Rev. 821 (2006); Stefan Rubin, Note, Tort Reform: A Call for Florida to Scale Back its
Independent Tort for the Spoliation of Evidence, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 345 (April 1999); Honorable
Margaret O'Mara Frossard et al., Spoliation of Evidence in Illinois: The Law After Boyd v.
Traveler's Insurance Co., 28 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 685 (Summer 1997); Ariel Porat et al., Liability
for Uncertainty: Making Evidential Damage Actionable, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1891 (July 1997).
HILLS vs. UPS, et al.
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evidence would have enabled plaintiff successfully to pursue the initial civil action." Nix v.
Hoke, 139 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D. D.C. 2001). Rather than try to predict whether the Utah Supreme
Court would adopt the spoliation of evidence doctrine, and in what circumstances such doctrine
would apply and what factors of the spoliation of evidence doctrine they would adopt, this Court
will adopt and apply the foregoing two factor analysis in making its decision.
UPS and Liberty Mutual are third party defendants in the context of Plaintiffs' intentional
spoliation of evidence claim. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, they were
having difficulty proving that Skyline's wrongful acts caused Mr. Hills death because of UPS and
Liberty Mutual's acts. Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Skyline's
recent admission of liability in Hills /clearly establishes that Plaintiffs are successful in the
proving liability in Hills L Plaintiffs seek "punitive damages," "damages resulting from tortuous
interference with a legal cause of action," "damages resulting from hindrance with a lawful cause
of action" and "any damages provided by law, equity, or court ruling in accordance with the laws
of the state of Utah." Any spoliation of evidence by UPS and Liberty Mutual relates to proving
liability, not damages. Because liability is no longer an issue in Hills I, Plaintiffs' legal remedy
is not affected by UPS and Liberty Mutual's actions. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs
intentional spoliation of evidence claim fails because Plaintiffs cannot show damages caused by
UPS and Liberty Mutual's acts.
As to Plaintiffs argument that their claim against UPS and Liberty Mutual is viable until
after the damages are determined in Hills /, the Court disagrees. Mr. Hill's death is not disputed.
Plaintiffs damages for Mr. Hill's wrongful death were fixed at the moment of Mr. Hill's death.
Nothing the Defendants' did after Mr. Hill's death could affect the value of Plaintiffs damages
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for his wrongful death. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants actions affected Plaintiffs probable
expectancy in damages, a valuable property right. Defendants could not alter Plaintiffs probable
expectancy in damages. Evidence of damages were frozen at the time of Mr. Hill's death.
Whatever damages Plaintiffs are entitled to receive for Mr. Hill's wrongful death will be
determined in the Hills I case between Plaintiffs and Skyline. All viable damage claims will be
made available to Plaintiffs in Hills I.
Plaintiffs argue the delay created by UPS and Liberty Mutual's acts diminished the value
of the their claim in Hills L Plaintiffs fail to present any case or statutory law that "mere delay
without other injury is actionable" for intentional spoliation of evidence. If there was a showing
that Plaintiffs' claims against Skyline were barred by the statute of limitations or Skyline's
insurer was insolvent, then there may be actionable injury. However, Plaintiffs fail to show that
there is anything more than mere delay.7 Plaintiffs are not prevented from recovering the full
extent of their damages that they can prove in Hills I.
Although Skyline is a first party to the underlying suit relating to Mr. Hills wrongful
death, Hills /, the same reasoning that applies to UPS and Liberty Mutual applies to Skyline with
regard to the intentional spoliation of evidence claim and the remaining damages. Whatever
damages Plaintiffs are entitled to from Skyline will be determined in Hills L Plaintiffs should
not have a second bite of the apple against Skyline in continuing Hills //where the issue of
damages will be conclusively decided between them in Hills L
Plaintiffs argue that punitive damages are claimed here against all of Defendants whereas
Hills I captures only one defendant, Skyline. Plaintiffs argue that all Defendants should be
7

See supra n.2.

HILLS vs. UPS, et al.

001234
11

Case No. 050407708

subject to punitive damages for their actions. Although the Court understands that there are more
parties and deeper pockets with three Defendants in the case at bar, rather than just one in Hills /,
Plaintiffs' desire for punitive damages is an inadequate basis to allow punitive damages to stand
alone. There must be a viable cause of action attached to Plaintiffs' punitive damages claim. As
decided above, Plaintiffs intentional spoliation claim fails, thus there is no meritorious cause of
action to justify a punitive damage award.
Plaintiffs argue that if punitive damages are not allowed as a remedy for Defendants
actions they will escape punishment and there is nothing to deter such action in the future. What
was done by Defendants in altering or destroying evidence is not condoned by this Court. The
law specifically provides sanctions where such actions occur. There was a punishment for UPS'
actions, a fine was imposed by Utah Occupational Safety and Health ("UOSH"), which is the
state entity that investigates accidents at work sites. UOSH has investigated both the death and
subsequent actions of UPS. As a result of their investigation, UOSH imposed a fine against
UPS, the amount of which is beyond this Court's purview. Although Plaintiffs would like a
private right of action to be created with UPS' duty to preserve an accident work site for UOSH
and a claim for punitive damages, Plaintiffs fail to cite a legal basis to do so.
There are other sanctions in place to prevent tampering with evidence. If a company or
employee choose to tamper with evidence, they are subject to criminal charges and
administrative penalties. Individuals that destroy evidence are subject to criminal charges for
Tampering with Evidence in Noncriminal Official Proceedings, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510.5., a
class A misdemeanor, and if committed in an official proceeding, a third degree felony. If an
employee of UPS, Liberty Mutual or Skyline knowingly or intentionally altered, destroyed,
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concealed or removed anything with the purpose of impairing the veracity or viability of the
thing in a proceeding or investigation that the person knew was pending or about to be instituted
or with the intent to prevent an investigation or proceeding, then the person can be prosecuted.
For a third degree felony conviction, the penalty could include imprisonment in a state prison for
a term not to exceed five years and a fine not to exceed $5,000 plus an 85% surcharge. For a
class A misdemeanor conviction, the penalty could include imprisonment in jail for a term not to
exceed one year and a fine not to exceed $2,500 plus an 85% surcharge. Utah Code Ann. §§ 763-203,-204,-301.
UPS, Liberty Mutual and/or Skyline could also be held criminally responsible for the
actions of an employee that tampered with evidence pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-204.
The fines for a felony conviction against one of them shall not exceed $20,000 plus an 85%
surcharge and for a class A misdemeanor conviction shall not exceed $10,000 plus an 85%
surcharge. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-302. Additional sanctions could include advertising of
conviction and/or disqualification of officer(s). Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-303.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that with Skyline's admission to liability
in Hills /, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, the Court
GRANTS the Renewed Motion to Dismiss the second and third causes of action and the
remaining damages claims in favor of UPS, Liberty Mutual and Skyline.

***** Intentionally left blank *****
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II
ALTERNATIVE BASIS TO DISMISS UPS
WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
UPS alleges that Plaintiffs' admission that their Hills //negligence claim against UPS is
barred by the Utah's Worker's Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101 etseq, (the Act)
is fatal to Plaintiffs' remaining claims of intentional misconduct and tortious interference because
the type of act necessary to overcome the Act's exclusivity provisions are not present. Plaintiffs
respond that the Act's exclusive remedy does not bar Plaintiffs' claims of intentional misconduct
and tortuous interference because this case implicates the dual capacity doctrine. Plaintiffs argue
that the Act only bars suit against employers for injuries arising out of the course of employment.
They argue that their injuries relative to these causes of action arose solely out of acts or
omissions that took place after their son's death - matters distinct from on the job injury.
Plaintiffs argue that after Mr. Hills died, UPS could not be acting in its capacity as Mr. Hills
employer. Plaintiffs further argue that UPS was acting outside the scope of its employeremployee relationship with Mark Hills when UPS intentionally altered evidence, lost or
destroyed evidence and UPS employees lied to Utah OSHA investigators, and UPS generally
engaged in a cover up of the cause of Mark Hills' death.
The Worker's Compensation Act "makes it clear that the intent of the legislature is to
provide an exclusive remedy for job related injuries." Hunsaker v. State of Utah, 870 P.2d at 899.
"The dual capacity doctrine directly conflicts with the exclusive remedy provision of [the Act]."
Id. The dual capacity doctrine is an exception to the exclusive-remedy provision of the Act that
has not been adopted in Utah, but the doctrine's existence has been acknowledged in three Utah
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cases, Bingham v. Lagoon Corporation, 707 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1985), Stewart v. CMI
Corporation, 740 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987); and Hunsaker v. State of Utah, 870 P.2d 893 (Utah
1993). "Under this doctrine, an employer normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive
remedy principle may become liable in tort to his own employee if he occupies, in addition to his
capacity as employer, a second capacity that confers on his obligations independent of those
imposed on him as an employer." Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d at 680.
The decisive test to determine if the dual capacity doctrine is invokable is not
whether the second function or capacity of the employer is different and separate
from the first. Rather, the test is whether the employer's conduct in the second
role or capacity has generated obligations that are unrelated to those flowing from
the company's or individual's first role as an employer. If the obligations are
related, the doctrine is not applicable. Id.
UPS' conduct that is the basis of Plaintiffs "intentional misconduct" and "tortuous
interference" causes of action relate to UPS' activities after Mr. Hills death. These activities
include: conducting their own investigation of the accident site prior to notifying OSHA or law
enforcement; contacting and working in concert with the co-defendants; removal, alteration of
equipment, material, or other evidence; failure to disclose, misrepresent and/or conceal their
actions to OSHA, and other like allegations. Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to
Plaintiff, UPS' conduct in its role with OSHA and the co-defendants did not generate obligations
that are unrelated to UPS' obligations flowing from its first role as an employer. Therefore, even
assuming the Utah Supreme Court would adopt the dual capacity doctrine, the Court concludes
that in this case, the dual capacity doctrine cannot be invoked to overcome the exclusive remedy
shield of the Act as it applies to UPS. As an alternative basis to dismiss UPS, the Courl
concludes that the exclusive remedy provision of the Act shields UPS from liability.
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ORDER
The Court hereby ORDERS:
UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss GRANTED on the second and third causes of action and
the damages claims asserted in Paragraphs 96(h), (j), (k), and (1), therefore, UPS, Liberty Mutual and
Skyline are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
DATED this J _ day of September, 2008.
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